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URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY
EXPERIMENT: MAPPING CHICAGO’S FARMS
AND GARDENS
Nate Ela*
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, scholars of law and geography have been foraging
in America’s cities, hunting for the commons. Along the way, a new
common sense has cropped up, which takes urban farms and community
gardens as prototypical examples of the urban commons. Farm fields and
garden plots produce not only vegetables, the argument goes, but also
opportunities for residents to access and use land as a shared, decommodified
resource. As both social practice and emergent institutional reality, such
urban commons challenge and are challenged by the logics of public and
private property that dominate our cities’ legal landscapes.
This Article, rather than assuming that urban farms and gardens are
examples of the urban commons, poses this as a question. Are they in fact
cases of commons governance? And if so, how do people bring this about?
I explore these questions from the ground up, through a socio-legal mapping
of how people have gained access to and sought to govern land for a
community garden and an urban farm in two neighborhoods on Chicago’s
South Side. This mapping suggests that we should conceive of urban farms
and gardens as sites where people experiment with the rules, norms, and
forms of property that govern urban land. Municipal policies can promote
property experiments that seek to treat urban land as a shared community
resource.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, scholars of law and geography have been foraging
in America’s cities, hunting for the commons. In the process, a new common
sense has cropped up, which takes urban farms and community gardens as
prototypical examples of the urban commons.1 Farm fields and garden plots
produce not only vegetables, the argument goes, but also opportunities for
residents to “reclaim the commons” by accessing and using land as a shared,
decommodified resource.2 As both social practice and emergent institutional

1. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN
REVOLUTION 74 (2012); Nathan McClintock & Jenny Cooper, Cultivating the Commons: An
Assessment of the Potential for Urban Agriculture on Oakland’s Public Land, UNIV. OF CAL.
DEP’T
OF
GEOGRAPHY
1
(Dec.
2010),
https://www.academia.edu/1226070/Cultivating_the_commons_An_assessment_of_the_pot
ential_for_urban_agriculture_on_Oaklands_public_land [https://perma.cc/VEE6-VUWX]
(providing an “inventory of open space with potential for agricultural production . . . within
the city limits of Oakland, California,” and to “locate Oakland’s ‘commons’”); Sheila R.
Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 93–96
(2011).
2. Nathan McClintock, Radical, Reformist, and Garden-Variety Neoliberal: Coming to
Terms with Urban Agriculture’s Contradictions, 19 LOCAL ENV’T 147, 154 (2014).
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reality, such urban commons challenge and are challenged by the dichotomy
of public and private property that dominate our cities’ legal landscapes.3
But are urban farms and community gardens actually examples of the
commons? And if commons governance is indeed emerging in the fields of
urban agriculture, how is that happening? These questions are often
bracketed, with farms and gardens assumed, without much investigation, to
be instances of commons governance, which comes about through “selforganization.”4 Instead of relying on local government to bring about the
commons by ordinance, urban farmers and gardeners are said to be “selforganizing” the rules of the urban commons.5
In practice, what does governance in urban farms and gardens look like?
Should we understand the rules and norms crafted by urban gardeners and
farmers as commons governance, and the result of self-organization? Does
that leave out important ways in which their socio-legal settings are not
governed as commons, and are the product of rules that urban growers take,
rather than those they make? A better understanding of these questions could
help people think about and advocate for policies that promote shared access
to urban land and other resources. This Article takes urban agriculture as a
key case of how people may be bringing about an urban commons, and
investigates the socio-legal processes by which urban gardeners, farmers,
and their policy allies may be bringing an urban commons—or some other
forms of governance—into being.
I draw on over four years of ethnographic research with farmers,
gardeners, and urban agriculture policymakers in Chicago, Illinois. From
2011 through 2015, I observed how farmers, gardeners, and their allies tried
to increase access to affordable land, and how they worked to govern and
use such land when it was made available. From time to time, I partnered
with the Chicago Food Policy Action Council in projects to identify new
3. See, e.g., Nicholas Blomley, Un-Real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public
Gardening, 36 ANTIPODE 614, 631–32 (2004).
4. Urban ecologists Johan Colding and Stephan Barthel have noted this tendency among
writers on community gardens. Johan Colding & Stephan Barthel, The Potential of ‘Urban
Green Commons’ in the Resilience Building of Cities, 86 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 156, 161 (2013)
(observing “a notable difference to what degree [urban green commons] can be viewed as
self-organized stewardship systems”); see also Marianne E. Krasny & Keith G. Tidball,
Community Gardens as Contexts for Science, Stewardship, and Civic Action Learning, 2
CITIES
AND
THE
ENV’T
1,
6
(2009),
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=cate
[https://perma.cc/V7M5-3UEY] (arguing that community gardens have “a tradition of selforganization”).
5. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 1, 94 (“The transformation of these small spaces into
productive land uses—community gardens—is a largely endogenous effort. Local residents
manage to come together, construct and maintain these fully functioning gardens in the
absence of government coercion or intervention, or the divestment of property rights in the
lots/gardens.”).
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parcels of land that could be used for urban agriculture and to explore new
means of arranging land tenure for such parcels.6 I also had opportunities to
learn about the process of land acquisition through research into the internal
archives of an urban farming organization7 and dozens of interviews with
farmers, gardeners, city officials, and urban planners.
My research suggests that with a ground-up explanation of how urban
growers participate in bringing about new forms of governance—which
some have proposed thinking of as an urban commons—it is best to set aside,
at least temporarily, concepts of “the commons” and “self-organization.”
Growers in Chicago seldom speak in those terms. To be sure, they and their
allies in and out of city government are keen to devise ways for people to
access and use land as a shared, productive resource. But the rules, forms,
and norms they are tinkering with—from zoning laws and land trusts8 to
landscaping regulations and lines from Leviticus9—are not what we usually
associate with the commons.
In this Article, I explore how we might understand the governance of land
for urban agriculture more realistically, as the fruit of a wide range of legal
experiments that urban growers and their allies have pursued in efforts to
expand urban food production. In Part I, I review how scholars of the
regulation of urban space have theorized urban farms and gardens as sites of
the urban commons. I then propose a method of socio-legal mapping to
understand how the property experiments underway in such places might—
or might not—be understood in terms of the commons and self-organization.
In Part II, I undertake such a socio-legal mapping, examining how the
terms of land use and access for farming and gardening have been shaped by
a wide range of laws, regulations, rules, and norms related to property. Two
sites serve as case studies for this mapping exercise. The Kumunda
community garden in Chicago’s Woodlawn neighborhood illustrates how
land access and use for urban gardens involves not only self-organized
garden rules that prioritize use and sharing, but also rules concerning the tax
status of nonprofits, municipal prohibitions on uncut grass, land deals

6. See, e.g., Erika Allen & Nate Ela, Cultivating Productive Landscapes: A Vision for
Community Based Urban Food Systems in the Millennium Reserve, ILL. DEP’T OF NAT. RES.,
COASTAL
MGMT.
PROGRAM
(Aug.
2015),
http://chicagofoodpolicy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Cultivating-Productive-Landscapes-December-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22VJ-PMQS]; see also Urban Farmland Working Group, CHI. FOOD POL’Y
ACTION COUNCIL, http://chicagofoodpolicy.com/policy-initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/6ZRLBNGS].
7. See infra Part II.B.1.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.A.5.
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negotiated with powerful neighborhood institutions, gleaning programs
inspired by the Torah, and state and local composting regulations.10
At the Growing Home urban farm in Englewood, people transitioning out
of homelessness and incarceration can gain job skills. The farm sits on two
pieces of land, one acquired through a transfer from the city, and another
held in trust by NeighborSpace, Chicago’s urban agriculture land trust.11
Understanding how Growing Home provides shared access to and benefits
from its land requires tracing how it emerged from experimentation with a
federal statute governing disposition of surplus federal property, and an
effort to reinterpret NeighborSpace’s mission to include commercial sites. I
also describe how Growing Home has helped spur conversations around how
land might be held in trust for for-profit farms.
I conclude by arguing that socio-legal scholars looking for sites of the
urban commons should focus on the property experiments carried out by
urban growers as they claim access to vacant land, and govern it as a shared
community resource. A socio-legal mapping of such experiments reveals
that growers and their allies may be self-organizing certain rules for
governing land for gardens and farms, but do so in relation to rules created
by state and local government and by reference to core elements of private
property. The claim, then, is neither that the Chicago cases examined here
represent an “urban commons,” nor that they are typical of how people
elsewhere govern land that residents may use as a shared resource. Rather,
they point us in the direction of a more grounded, realistic approach to
understanding how people bring about and attempt to institutionalize
alternative modes of governing urban land. This perspective could help craft
public policies that encourage the collective management of land and other
community resources.
I. HUNTING THE URBAN COMMONS
Until relatively recently, the vast majority of research on common
property resources and commons governance overlooked the urban
commons.12 But over the past decade, urban scholars across a wide range of
disciplines have grown interested in the commons as a category of analysis,
an institution, and a social practice. As scholars have gone on the hunt for
the urban commons, they have found it in a wide range of settings, from

10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Legal Geographer Nicholas Blomley calculated that as of late 2005 “the Digital
Library of the Commons, held by the influential International Association for the Study of
Common Property, reveals that only 21 of the available papers on common property (1.2%)
concerned the ‘urban commons.’” Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right and the
Property of the Poor, 17 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 311, 318 (2008).
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neighborhood orderliness13 to abandoned department stores,14 sidewalks15 to
dog parks,16 public spaces17 to limited equity housing cooperatives.18
Excitement for the urban commons among planners has produced
competitions to bring the concept to new spaces.19 Some scholars have
suggested that the city itself is a commons, and ought to be governed as
such.20
A.

The Commons in the Garden

One of the most frequently cited examples of the urban commons,
however, is the community garden.21 Legal scholars and social scientists
have made a wide range of claims about what community gardens, taken as
the prototypical example of the urban commons, make possible. Some, like
geographer Nathan McClintock, take gardens and urban agriculture as a way
to produce food in a manner that is cooperative or collective.22 For David
Harvey, what is more interesting is how gardens are an example of what he

13. See, e.g., Daniel Tumminelli O’Brien, Managing the Urban Commons: The Relative
Influence of Individual and Social Incentives on the Treatment of Public Space, 23 HUM.
NATURE 467 (2012) (evaluating specific patterns of the urban commons via comparing
physical and social disorder).
14. See Blomley, supra note 12, at 312.
15. See Nicholas Blomley, How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law, Traffic and the
‘Function of the Place’, 44 URB. STUD. 1697, 1705 (2007).
16. See Daniel Matisoff & Douglas Noonan, Managing Contested Greenspace:
Neighborhood Commons and the Rise of Dog Parks, 6 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 28,
https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/10.18352/ijc.299/
[https://perma.cc/B42NKTPS].
17. See Ash Amin, Collective Culture and Urban Public Space, 12 CITY 5, 6 (2008).
18. See Amanda Huron, The Work of the Urban Commons: Limited-Equity Cooperatives
in Washington, D.C. (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York)
(on file with author).
19. See DESIGNING THE URBAN COMMONS, http://designingtheurbancommons.org/
[https://perma.cc/4H8L-FT2J] (“Re-imagining spaces in London as places for collaboration,
sharing, and collective ownership. A competition inspired by the rights to the commons.”).
20. See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, COMMONWEALTH, 153–54 (2009); Sheila R.
Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281 (2016).
21. See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, NORTHERN RESEARCH STATION, RESTORATIVE
COMMONS: CREATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING THROUGH URBAN LANDSCAPES 185 (Lindsay
Campbell & Anne Wiesen, eds., 2009) [hereinafter RESTORATIVE COMMONS]; Efrat
Eizenberg, Actually Existing Commons: Three Moments of Space of Community Gardens in
New York City, 44 ANTIPODE 764 (2011); Foster, supra note 1, at 93–97; HARVEY, supra note
1, at 74; McClintock & Cooper, supra note 1, at 10. See generally Laura Lawson & Abbilyn
Miller, Community Gardens and Urban Agriculture as Antithesis to Abandonment: Exploring
a Citizenship-Land Model, in THE CITY AFTER ABANDONMENT, 17–40 (Margaret Dewar and
June Manning Thomas, eds. 2013); Colding & Barthel, supra note 4, at 159, 160; Johan
Colding et al., Urban Green Commons: Insights on Urban Common Property Systems, 23
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 1039, 1041 (2013); McClintock, supra note 2.
22. See McClintock & Cooper, supra note 1, at 1.
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calls a “social practice of commoning,” which decommodifies both the land
and its products.23 Others focus on what the garden commons produce other
than just food, such as new neighborhood social norms,24 public health,25 or
urban resilience.26 Other authors focus less on what the garden commons
makes possible than on how it is routinely threatened by development.27 This
has led some to suggest policies that could protect the urban commons by
protecting urban gardens. Legal scholar Sheila Foster, for example, proposes
that courts recognize a limited property right in urban gardens so as to
support injunctions that would bar the city from taking public land if the
public value accruing from the gardens would be irreparably harmed and
such harm is not outweighed by competing land uses.28
Relatively less has been said about how urban commons emerge or how
people strategize and act to bring them about. To the extent scholars have
paid attention to the emergence of the commons in a garden setting, they
have focused on whether community gardens are endogenously organized.
Foster, for example, argues that gardens are organized largely without
governmental support.29 Indeed, it is not uncommon for studies of
community gardens to highlight how government actors are antagonists.30
There are good reasons why scholars have been drawn by the promise of
community gardens as a case of endogenous, self-organized management of
land. The urban commons in general, and community gardens in particular,
seem to offer a third way of managing urban land—an alternative to market
allocation and public ownership. This not only offers an exciting opportunity

23. HARVEY, supra note 1, at 73. Harvey, like other commons activists, picks up on the
suggestion made by historian Peter Linebaugh that we think of the commons as a process—
commoning—rather than simply as a static institution. See PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA
CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 279 (2008) (“To speak of the
commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at best and dangerous at worst—the
commons is an activity . . . .”).
24. Foster, supra note 1, at 95 (“[Gardeners] . . . become norm-entrepreneurs. Their
actions transform not just the physical space but also the norms and behavior that govern that
space.”).
25. See generally RESTORATIVE COMMONS, supra note 21.
26. See generally Colding & Barthel, supra note 4.
27. See Eizenberg, supra note 21, at 777.
28. See Sheila Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 575 (2006).
29. See Foster, supra note 1, at 94.
30. Government actors are often understood as enemies of the garden commons, clapping
developers on the back as they fire up their bulldozers to level a garden on a vacant lot. This,
of course, is part of the dynamic of how urban land use is transformed, and the story of Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani’s opposition to vacant lot gardens in New York City has come to be
legendary in the literature. See, e.g., Lynn A. Staeheli, Don Mitchell & Kristina Gibson,
Conflicting Rights to the City in New York’s Community Gardens, 58 GEOJOURNAL 197, 200–
01 (2002).
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to highlight actually-existing alternative forms of resource management,31
but it also offers fertile urban soil in which the theoretical ideas developed
by Elinor Ostrom might take root.32
Yet while gardeners may indeed self-organize in the sense that the rules
that guide how they garden are not given directly by state agencies, it would
be incorrect to think that community gardens or urban farms are wholly
disconnected from rules enforced by the state—or, for that matter, from core
elements of private property. Support from the government may not come
in the form of rules or even grants of land or money (though it often does).
But everything from local ordinances to federal statutes creates affordances
that enable community gardens to be organized.
This Article seeks to make these connections apparent. It maps the wide
variety of rules and norms that provide urban growers opportunities to claim
and govern land as a shared, community resource. In so doing, it examines
what a focus on endogeneity and self-organization—central concepts in
studies of commons governance—might overlook. How might people bring
about an urban commons not only through self-organization, but also by
contesting, leveraging, and adapting rules made possible thanks to local laws
and the norms of private property? The answer to this question requires a
richer sense of the rules, norms, and practices at play in the fields of the city.
B.

Socio-Legal Mapping

The aim of this Article is to sketch a map of the rules and relationships at
stake as people bring about shared uses for land on the South Side of
Chicago. I develop this map through case studies of a community garden
and an urban farm. Rather than a geographical mapping of urban farms and
gardens, to understand where they are,33 the exercise is one of socio-legal
mapping, focused on tracing the relationships of power and governance at
stake in the legal landscape of the city.
Several different methods inform this strategy of socio-legal mapping.
One, power mapping, is an analytical tool familiar to organizers for social
change. This form of mapping traces relations of power in order to identify

31. Eizenberg, supra note 21, at 766.
32. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (elaborating a theory of why and how voluntary
organizations can solve collective action dilemmas in governing common pool resources, and
providing examples of communal governance of meadows, forests, water rights, and
fisheries).
33. This is a worthy, and remarkably challenging, project taken on by other scholars. See,
e.g., John R. Taylor & Sarah Taylor Lovell, Mapping Public and Private Spaces of Urban
Agriculture in Chicago Through the Analysis of High-Resolution Aerial Images in Google
Earth, 108 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 57 (2012).
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pressure points by which organizers might influence those relations.34
Participatory mapping, meanwhile, is a technique conceived of and
frequently deployed by development professionals, which solicits
participants’ opinions on features relevant to their environments.35 Here, the
goal is to understand power, and to do so through participation and
interaction with people who experience it in their day-to-day routines—in
this case, of gaining access to and managing urban land. The results may
contribute to identifying pressure points for social change, but may also be
aimed at clarifying and changing conceptions of what social practices and
relations are in play in a particular social setting.
As such, socio-legal mapping is a ground-up method, which takes the
daily practices and strategies of actors as the basis for understanding the
institutions of power in play in a field of social action, rather than assuming
certain institutions—such as the commons—will necessarily appear because
that is what a theory predicts. In this sense, it is influenced strongly by
institutional ethnography, an approach developed by the sociologist Dorothy
Smith.36 To understand the structured social relations that shape how people
work in a particular setting, Smith proposed that the “mapping of social
relations” begin at one research site and expand from there, “so that the larger
organization that enters into and shapes it becomes visible.”37
The inspiration to pay special attention to legal rules and power relations
in such a mapping exercise draws on law professor David Kennedy’s recent
thinking and writing on cartographic methods for understanding struggle and
expertise in global governance.38 Kennedy, like Smith, focuses his analysis
on how people at particular sites pursue projects. As Kennedy observes, this
is simply the social scientist adopting a method similar to that used by people
figuring out how to make their way in a particular social setting: the first step
toward strategic action is often to trace the nodes and relations of power that

34. See, e.g., Eva Schiffer, The Power Mapping Tool: A Method for the Empirical
Research of Power Relations, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST. 19 (2007),
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/38994
[https://perma.cc/L7XXBBEU].
35. See Jon Corbett, Good Practices in Participatory Mapping, INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC.
DEV. 7 (2009), http://www.ifad.org/pub/map/pm_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG5J-G552].
36. See generally DOROTHY E. SMITH, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR
PEOPLE 51 (2005) (explaining the two aims of institutional ethnography include “produc[ing]
for people what might be called ‘maps’ of the ruling relations,” and “build[ing] knowledge
and methods of discovering institutions and, more generally, the ruling relations of
contemporary Western society”).
37. Id. at 35. See generally MARIE CAMPBELL & FRANCES GREGOR, MAPPING SOCIAL
RELATIONS: A PRIMER IN DOING INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY (2004).
38. DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016).
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shape one’s environment—be it economic, political, legal, or physical.39 If
savvy community organizers and development professionals map their
worlds, then perhaps it makes sense for social scientists to adopt a similar
method.
Kennedy seeks to understand the projects by which people struggle and
pursue their interests and thereby shape the institutions and rules that we
think of as global governance.40 This leads him to focus on law, since people
pursuing projects often treat law both as “a kind of guidebook to the global
terrain of struggle,” and as a source of “opportunities to harness coercion to
capture what they value as gain.”41
Here we are interested in a different scale—that of gardens,
neighborhoods, and cities, rather than the global—but the method is similar.
I focus on how people mobilize law in pursuit of their farming and gardening
projects, since that often both shapes how they see the terrain on which value
can be created and is a way of getting other people to provide access and use
of land and other resources.42
Yet I also look beyond law and legal expertise to understand the other
forms of knowledge and expertise people use to legitimize their projects and
get others to support them.43 People may seek access to land as a source of
value by marshaling arguments that the law affords them the right to use it
in a certain way, but also by asserting convincingly that the plot of land could
be used to grow some quantity of food, or as a site on which some number
of unemployed people could be employed, or trained in job skills. Such
assertions may complement legal arguments by developing moral claims
rooted in the particular expertise of the master gardener or the social
entrepreneur. Socio-legal mapping, then, helps us to focus on the relations—
between people, organizations, forms of expertise, even species—that enable
(or constrain) creative, collaborative, and collective uses of land.44
The goal is not, however, to draw a definitive and final map of a sociolegal landscape or particular territory. Such an effort would likely be futile,
or at least not long-lasting, since the rules and forms of knowledge at stake
in even a single city are constantly in flux. Instead, the aim in bringing
mapping to bear is to open up and destabilize preset notions of the way
people relate to one another in the context of a given socio-legal situation,
such as a commons. Is an urban commons in a community garden about selforganization—or, if we traced out the myriad relations of power and

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 74.
See id.
Id. at 61, 70.
See infra Part III.
Id.
Id.
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authority at stake in bringing about or blocking an urban garden or farm,
might we find that there is much more in play?
C.

Property Experimentalism

In mapping the rules, norms, and forms of authority that influence how
people access and govern land for urban farms and gardens, I pay special
attention to how people are experimenting with features of their socio-legal
landscape. At the broadest level, urban agriculture itself is an experiment to
see how much sense it makes to have farms and gardens in the city—and if
so, of what type, where, producing what, and benefiting whom. As the
assistant director of Growing Home put it to me: “we’re running an
experiment that is testing the hypothesis that building urban farms will
increase human capital and the financial health of Englewood.”45
To test the effects of urban agriculture, growers first have to get land. This
in itself involves experiments, such as tests to see what happens when one
makes a claim based on a certain law, or a certain form of moral reasoning.
In effect, gardeners and farmers—and, as we will see, advocates for the
homeless, synagogue congregants, directors of land trusts, and others46—are
setting up what the historian of science Hans-Jorg Rheinberger conceives of
as experimental systems.47 Such systems, Rheinberger writes, “can be
regarded as the smallest functional units of research; they are set up in order
to give answers to questions that we are not yet able to formulate clearly.”48
Quoting Francois Jacob, who worked in Louis Pasteur’s lab, Rheinberger
describes an experimental system, in a typical case, as “a machine for making
the future.”49
The notion here is that people who would like to intervene in a city’s
landscape or its political economy—who would like to remake its future—
are developing experimental systems. By doing so, they can figure out what
happens when they make a particular claim, deploy a particular piece of
knowledge, or argue in a new way. They may not yet be able to clearly state
the questions to which they are seeking answers about how the city works
and how it might work differently. But in making claims to land or seeking
to change the rules and norms that shape how it is used, allocated, and owned,

45. Interview with Rebekah Silverman, Assistant Dir., Growing Home, in Chi., Ill. (July
15, 2015) (on file with author).
46. See infra Parts II.B & III.A.
47. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Experimental Systems: Difference, Graphematicity,
Conjecture, in INTELLECTUAL BIRDHOUSE: ARTISTIC PRACTICE AS RESEARCH 92 (Florian
Dombois et al. eds. 2012).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 92 (quoting FRANÇOIS JACOB, THE STATUE WITHIN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 9
(1988)).

258

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

they are seeking to shape the future of that land—and by extension, a
neighborhood and potentially even the city itself.
This process of experimentation with property resonates with the work of
legal scholars Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel on democratic
experimentalism.50 Both scholars understand actors to be continually
involved in a pragmatic process of problem-solving.51 Here, however, our
focus is not on experiments at the level of a governance system as a whole,
but rather in the projects of particular people and organizations. Although
Dorf and Sabel would hope to see agencies and firms collaborating and
sharing information with one another,52 this is not always the case with urban
growers engaged in property experiments. A grower who figures out a new
way to gain access to land may be motivated to share the outcome of the
experiment with other growers, or may see that knowledge as proprietary, a
means of getting out ahead of other growers.
Finally, it is worth noting how moments of crisis might foster property
experiments. Property scholars Nestor Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand
have observed that social and economic crises can lay bare fundamental
questions about the nature of ownership.53 This fits with the sociological
intuition that institutions of commons governance might have a
countercyclical character, with people more likely to develop them during
economic recessions or in the wake of a natural disaster.54 Whether property
experiments underway in urban gardens or farms result in an urban commons
or some other form of governing shared spaces, we will see that the open
fields and vacant lots that serve as actors’ laboratories are often the legacy
of social and economic crises.
II. PROPERTY EXPERIMENTS IN CHICAGO’S GARDENS AND FARMS
During the four years I spent talking and working with urban farmers and
gardeners in Chicago, it was quite rare to hear them speak in terms of the
commons. To be sure, they and their allies in and out of city government are
keen to devise ways for people to access and use land as a shared, productive
resource. But as they pursue projects to make land available for gardens and

50. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998).
51. See CHRISTOPHER K. ANSELL, PRAGMATIST DEMOCRACY: EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING
AS PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 6 (2011) (referring to Dorf and Sabel).
52. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 50, at 285.
53. See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1607, 1608 (2010).
54. See Thomas K. Rudel, The Commons and Development: Unanswered Sociological
Questions,
5
INT’L
J.
OF
THE
COMMONS
303,
314
(2011),
http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/ijc/article/view/248 [https://perma.cc/TW43A84H].
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farms, the commons is not an everyday category of analysis or of advocacy.
Instead, gardeners, farmers, and their allies in and out of city government are
tinkering with a wide range of rules, norms, and forms of property: zoning,
land trusts, landscaping regulations, even passages from the Old
Testament.55 These are things that a hunt for the urban commons might
overlook. If some new form of governance is emerging as people create
farms and gardens, then to understand how that is happening we should look
to the concepts and tools that people actually use, rather than assuming that
the commons is emerging through a process of self-organization.
In this Part, I explore how we might understand the urban commons more
realistically, as the fruit of a wide range of legal experiments that urban
growers and their allies have pursued in efforts to expand urban farming and
gardening. Two sites serve as starting points for a socio-legal mapping.
Focusing on these sites, I trace how a wide range of laws, regulations, rules,
and norms related to property have shaped the terms by which urban
gardeners and farmers access and use land. The claim is not that these sites
in Chicago represent how people everywhere cultivate spaces where people
can use urban land as a common resource. Instead, reading the legal and
physical landscapes they inhabit offers a way to begin to unpack the complex
ways in which people govern resources in places that have often been
understood simply as the urban commons.
A.

Kumunda Community Garden

On the east side of Kimbark Street, half a block south of 64th Street, there
is a community garden known to its members as the Kumunda Garden. One
of many gardens in the Woodlawn neighborhood on Chicago’s South Side,
Kumunda is the size of two city lots, about one-third of an acre.56 Other
vacant lots sit to the south, offering ample sunlight for the garden plots.57
There are about forty plots, laid out in rows, ten feet by ten feet each. Some

55. See infra Parts II.A., II.B.
56. The 2015 map by Garden Resources of Woodlawn (GROW) identifies sixteen
community and school gardens in the neighborhood. See Woodlawn Community and School
Gardens, GROW (2015), http://growwoodlawn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GROWcommunity-gardens-map-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSR8-EDMZ].
57. Google’s street view feature provides a view of the garden and the adjoining lots. See
Google
Street
View
(Sept.
2015),
https://www.google.com/maps/place/6431+S+Kimbark+Ave,+Chicago,+IL+60637/@41.77
75338,-87.5945745,3a,75y,90h,90t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sNf—y7vTIkUjmPOIL6OuA!2e0!4m2!3m1!1s0x880e291e7e4ee8d5:0x7601ac2fd5150304 [https://perma.cc/LFQ9BHGX] [hereinafter Google Street View].
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of the gardeners have raised their plots by ringing them with boards and
adding compost, but many are at the same level as the garden paths.58
The garden itself is ringed by a snow fence of wooden stakes to the south
and along the back alley to the east and a metal chain-link fence along the
sidewalk to the west.59 To the north, the property line is shared with a
neighboring house and is marked off by more chain-link fencing.60 During
the summer of 2015, a row of small kale plants lined the strip of land between
the fence and the sidewalk on Kimbark Street, an offering to passers-by.61
At the southeast corner, a pile of woodchips—material for keeping down
grass along the garden paths—spilled over onto both sides of the fence,
making it possible to step over the fence by climbing the mound.62
I was a member of the Kumunda Garden for the 2014 and the first half of
the 2015 growing seasons. Tending a ten-by-ten-foot plot offered a day-today sense of how such a garden operates as space shared by people who both
live in the neighborhood and come from other parts of the city. I observed
how growers work together to manage the space, and to strike a balance
between sharing their bounty and keeping it from being taken by outsiders.
Much of this they figure out on their own, whether in person at the garden or
via the group’s email list.
To understand how the Kumunda Garden came about, and how it
continues to exist, we have to look beyond just the rules of the garden and
examine how it became possible to use this land in the first place. That
requires tracing how the land became available: both how the history of
Woodlawn resulted in a large number of empty lots, and how gardeners
negotiated to make some of those lots available for food production.
Woodlawn today is a patchy landscape. Three-floor brick apartment
buildings are interspersed with vacant land. In the fall of 2015, the City of
Chicago owned 387 vacant lots in Woodlawn.63 This land has a history, and
like the land used by the Kumunda Gardeners, many of the other lots that
now sit vacant once had multi-family apartments on them.

58. Photos of the garden are available on a blog created by two of the gardeners. See
Vertical
Gardening,
NUESTROPEQUENOJARDIN
(May
13,
2014),
https://nuestropequenojardin.wordpress.com/2014/05/ [https://perma.cc/2EA4-RB64].
59. See id.
60. See Google Street View, supra note 57.
61. See Google Street View, supra note 57.
62. See
Touch
and
Go,
NUESTROPEQUENOJARDIN
(May
28,
2014),
https://nuestropequenojardin.wordpress.com/2014/05/28/176/
[https://perma.cc/F6HEMQ65].
63. See
City-Owned
Land
Inventory,
CITY
OF
CHI.
(2011),
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Community-Economic-Development/City-Owned-LandInventory/aksk-kvfp [https://perma.cc/P3AY-RMKA].
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Ninety years ago, Woodlawn was a neighborhood predominantly
populated by white people. In 1930, at the beginning of the Great
Depression, it was home to 66,000 Chicagoans, 86% of whom were white.64
But during the Great Depression, the white housing market slumped; black
families from neighborhoods to the west sought to buy into the
neighborhood. At first, they were blocked by racially-restrictive covenants,
which covered Woodlawn and most of the other neighborhoods that bordered
the so-called “Black Belt” neighborhoods, where African-American families
arriving from the South had been forced to buy or rent during the first great
migration.65
Both black families seeking to buy into the neighborhood and white
families seeking to sell fought the covenants in court. In 1940, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Hansberry v. Lee that minority members of a class
action were not barred by res judicata from selling to a black family.66
Although the ruling focused on the details of class action procedure, its effect
was to begin to undo the system of racially restrictive covenants established
in Woodlawn and other neighborhoods in Chicago.67
Following World War II, the black population of Woodlawn rose quickly,
while white families fled to the suburbs.68 By 1960, the population was
81,000—nearly ninety percent of which was black.69 But during the late
1960s, the neighborhood was beset by disinvestment, as white-owned
business owners moved out, fearing a repeat of the riots that occurred in the
black neighborhoods of Chicago’s West Side in the wake of the 1968 killing
of Martin Luther King, Jr.70 From 1968 through 1971, some 362 abandoned
buildings in Woodlawn were reportedly destroyed by arson;71 this came in
the wake of a 1968 change to fire insurance regulation that encouraged
property owners in neighborhoods with low property values to take out large
policies on their otherwise worthless buildings.72

64. See Amanda Seligman, Woodlawn, ELEC. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005),
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/1378.html
[https://perma.cc/C2ZHQ96P].
65. See Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
481, 483 (1987).
66. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 42, 46 (1940).
67. See generally Kamp, supra note 65, at 498. For a powerful account of Chicago’s
history of racism in housing, see Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC
(June
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-forreparations/361631/ [https://perma.cc/5X3H-Q88B].
68. See Seligman, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION
OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 335 (2009) (quoting an observer as saying buildings “aren’t worth
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In the 1960s, the University of Chicago, which dominates the
neighborhood of Hyde Park just to the north of Woodlawn, worked with the
city council to declare much of the northern section of Woodlawn blighted.
However, community organizers with The Woodlawn Organization, a
community association formed with the assistance of Saul Alinsky’s
Industrial Areas Foundation, resisted these plans.73
Since the 1960s, the population of Woodlawn has declined significantly.
By 2010, fewer than 26,000 people lived in the neighborhood.74 This rapid
and enduring demographic decline has reshaped the physical and social
landscape. In addition to the swathes of vacant lots, the neighborhood has a
number of churches that have been left with diminished congregations, as
those African-American families with the means to move to the suburbs left
the neighborhood.75
By the early 1990s some conservationists in Chicago were starting to see
vacant lots as a potential resource. In 1998, the leading land trust for the
Chicago region, Openlands, found that the city ranked eighteenth out of
twenty large U.S. cities in terms of open space per capita.76 The same report
noted that at the same time, there was an abundance of vacant lots, many of
which were owned by the city.77 One of the recommendations flowing from
the report was to create a land trust for community gardens, and to make sure
neighborhood spaces were safe from development.78
In 1996, an
intergovernmental agreement between the City of Chicago, the Cook County
Forest Preserve, and the Chicago Park District created NeighborSpace, a new
land trust with the mission to hold land for such gardens in the City of
Chicago.79 The forms of land security and land tenure afforded by

anything unless you burn them,” and describing the practice of arson on Chicago’s South and
West Sides).
73. See id. at 128–131.
74. See City of Chicago Census 2010 and 2000, CITY OF CHI.,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/zlup/Zoning_Main_Page/Publications/
Census_2010_Community_Area_Profiles/Census_2010_and_2000_CA_Populations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4KE-B263].
75. See Lynn LeCluyse, Black Population Explodes in South Suburbs, HUB BUB BLOG,
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://blogs.luc.edu/hubbub/featured/black-population-explodes-in-southsuburbs/ [https://perma.cc/V7X6-GS8L].
76. CITY OF CHI., CHI. PARK DIST. & FOREST PRES. DIST. OF COOK CTY., CITYSPACE: AN
OPEN SPACE PLAN FOR CHICAGO ii (Jan. 1998).
77. Id. at iii.
78. Id. at iii–iv.
79. See CHI. CITY COUNCIL, COMM. ON FIN., AUTHORIZATION FOR EXECUTION OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT AND FOREST PRESERVE
DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF “NEIGHBORSPACE,” (Mar. 26, 1996).
http://www.eatbettermovemore.org/sa/policies/pdftext/ChicagoNeighborSpace.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BF27-S75Y].
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NeighborSpace have come to be crucial to protecting land not only for
gardens but also for farms.80
1.

Dispossession as Threat and as Opportunity

The Kumunda Garden sits on land owned by the First Presbyterian Church
of Chicago, not by NeighborSpace.81 Compared to many other community
gardens, Kumunda has abundant resources, the result of its organizers
having seized an opportunity made possible by dispossession. Although
development is often understood as a threat to gardens, instances of
dispossession can also create opportunities to both mobilize a community of
growers, and potentially even expand garden operations elsewhere.
Although growing only began at the Kumunda Garden in 2013, its story
begins as early as the mid-1990s, several blocks to the north. That was when
gardeners began digging up plots at the corner of 61st Street and Dorchester
Avenue at what became known as the 61st Street community garden.82 This
land was owned by the University of Chicago, which either owns or has
informally laid claim to much of the vacant land in the northern part of
Woodlawn in the expectation that it may be used to expand its campus in the
future.83
In 2009, the University had such an opportunity for expansion. It planned
to build a new building for the Chicago Theological Seminary at the corner
of Dorchester and 60th Street.84 Officials from the University decided to use
the land on which the 61st Street Community Garden sat as a staging area for
construction, and the University’s community relations department informed
the gardeners that they would have to leave at the end of the 2009 season. 85
As in many other cases, gardeners organized themselves to resist
displacement. Since the legal right of the University to displace the
gardeners was uncontested, the moral duty it owed to the gardeners who had

80. See infra Part II.B.3.
81. Interview with Benjamin Murphy, Coordinator, 65th & Woodlawn Cmty. Garden, in
Chi., Ill. (June 13, 2014) (on file with author).
82. See
The
Urban
Farm
Project,
EXPERIMENTAL STATION
(2012),
http://staging.xstation.webfactional.com/food-culture/urban-farm-project
[https://perma.cc/CFY2-6EPX].
83. See LaDale Winling, Obama Presidential Library Part 2, URB. OASIS BLOG (Aug. 25,
2012),
http://www.urbanoasis.org/2012/08/25/obama-presidential-library-pt-2/
[https://perma.cc/22KJ-3GY8] (describing how the University bought property south of its
core campus as a means of both expanding the campus and redeveloping the neighborhood).
84. See generally New Chicago Theological Seminary, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO:
FACILITIES SERVICES (2016), http://facilities.uchicago.edu/construction/theological-seminary/
[https://perma.cc/HL5L-KLK2].
85. See 61st Street Community Garden Woodlawn, HYDE PARK-KENWOOD COMMUNITY
CONFERENCE,
http://www.hydepark.org/gardens_of_HPK/61st%20Community%20Garden.htm [https://perma.cc/2Q7J-WYZZ].
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been using the land became the issue. In mobilizing around this issue, the
garden benefited from the social and cultural capital of its gardeners. Many
of the gardeners were not long-time residents of Woodlawn, but rather
University of Chicago students who had moved into the neighborhood. They
understood how to negotiate with, and mobilize against, the University.86
Among other things, they used digital video storytelling and conversations
as a way to rhetorically claim the land, even though they only had a limited
right to use it.87 Among the people who spoke out in favor of the garden was
Ben Helphand, the Executive Director of NeighborSpace.88
Ultimately, the University agreed to provide compensation to the
displaced gardeners.89 University officials arranged with the local alderman
to have a vacant lot at 62nd Street and Dorchester made available for
gardening, and in the years since, this site has been converted into a
NeighborSpace garden. The University also agreed to donate resources both
toward this new garden and other community gardens in Woodlawn.90
A community garden at 65th Street and Woodlawn Avenue, which had
been founded two years earlier, was one of the gardens that benefited from
the University’s largess.91 Much of the support from the University was used
to buy compost for creating new garden plots.92 In this sense, the
dispossession from the land at 61st Street and Dorchester literally made new
land—in the form of soil—available elsewhere in the neighborhood.
The 65th & Woodlawn community garden was incredibly popular. Thanks
to the resources provided by the University, its founder arranged to not only
bring in compost, but also have its 10’ x 10’ plots hooked up to a drip
irrigation system.93 This drew gardeners not only from the middle class
Hyde Park neighborhood to Woodlawn’s north, but even from
neighborhoods on the north side of Chicago—a half hour drive, even without
traffic.94

86. The gardeners documented their struggle in meticulous detail on their website. See id.
87. See Garden Conversations, INVISIBLE INST., http://invisible.institute/gardenconversations/ [https://perma.cc/TY3H-UPUH].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. One summer day in 2014, I met a gardener who told me she lived in Rogers Park, on
the north side, but could not get a plot there because there was too much demand for the
garden plots available. North Side gardeners who do get off a waiting list often have less
space available than in Woodlawn. For example, during the 2015 season the Peterson Garden
Project, one of the leading gardening organizations on the North Side, offered members a
four-by-eight-foot gardening plot, without irrigation, for $85. See Garden With Us, PETERSON
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By 2012, the 65th and Woodlawn Garden had a waiting list. In 2013, its
founder arranged with the First Presbyterian Church to use a vacant lot on
the block to the east, which would become the Kumunda Garden. Again, the
resources made available from the land deal with the University of Chicago
helped get it going.95
2.

The Threat in the Tall Grass

It might seem natural that a church would support community gardening,
and First Presbyterian has made land available for various growing projects
since at least 2000.96 But the reason why church leaders were eager to make
land available for the Kumunda Garden might be rooted in a recent change
to Chicago’s landscaping ordinance.
In 2008, Chicago created a weed abatement regulation, which levies steep
fines for any “weeds” over ten inches in length. 97 The regulation has been
actively enforced; from 2009 to 2014, the city reportedly collected over $19
million in fines for uncut weeds.98
For absentee owners, or landowners without the means to keep up
landscaping to legal requirements, the weed ordinance creates a risk. First
Presbyterian, a small congregation with a large inventory of vacant lots,
faces a particularly large risk. If church leaders see the vacant land as a type
of investment—as the founder of the 65th Street community garden
assumes99— then selling properties at the bottom of the market, in the wake
of not only decades of disinvestment but also the financial crisis, does not
make sense.
Community gardens offer a solution to this problem. Allowing people to
grow a garden on a vacant lot effectively transfers the responsibility to keep

GARDEN PROJECT, http://petersongarden.org/garden-with-us/ [https://perma.cc/P2MZWALP].
95. Interview with Benjamin Murphy, supra note 81.
96. In addition to the two community gardens, it has for many years let an older man from
the neighborhood garden half of a large vacant lot across the street from the church, at 64th
Street and Kimbark Avenue; the other half of the lot has been used by nonprofit organizations
that grow food for the church’s food pantry. Interview with Meg Mass, Coordinator of the
Abundance Project, in Chi., Ill. (Sept. 10, 2014) (on file with author). In addition, the Church
has a dilapidated greenhouse on its south side, which was built by in the 1970s by the Center
for Neighborhood Technology. See Pioneering Urban Gardening, CENT. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD
TECH.
(2015),
http://www.cnt.org/projects/pioneering-urban-gardening
[https://perma.cc/BY2R-3QE8].
97. MUN. CODE OF CHI. § 7-28-120 (2008).
98. See Benjamin Woodard, Weeds or Wildflowers? City Collects Millions in Fines for
‘Uncut
Weeds’,
DNAINFO
(Aug.
6,
2014),
http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140806/rogers-park/weeds-or-wildflowers-city-collectsmillions-fines-for-uncut-weeds [https://perma.cc/RJ5P-J8ZC].
99. Interview with Benjamin Murphy, supra note 81.
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up the lot to gardeners, reducing the risk of fines for uncut grass. As the
founder of the garden pointed out to me, it also fits with the federal tax
regulations concerning how nonprofits may rent out their surplus land or
buildings; since the gardens are also non-profits, sharing the land with them
does not jeopardize the Church’s tax-exempt status.100
Yet despite the way in which the weed ordinance has incentivized sharing,
gardeners elsewhere in the city are of mixed minds about the ordinance.
Some have been hit repeatedly with fines, prompting Advocates for Urban
Agriculture, one of Chicago’s food and gardening policy organizations, to
draft a revised ordinance that would increase city inspectors’ sensitivity to
native plants, which might grow higher than ten inches.101 Yet gardeners
elsewhere benefit from the leverage that the strict weed ordinance has
provided vis-à-vis landowners who might otherwise simply let their land sit
idle. One organizer who started a community garden in the McKinley Park
neighborhood told me that staff for the local alderman contacted the person
who owned an attractive piece of land and offered to waive $1500 in
landscaping fines if the owner made the property available for use as a
community garden.102
3.

Use It or Lose It

With the land available from the church, the Kumunda gardeners needed
to develop some rules. So long as they kept the land tended, the church
largely—but not entirely—leaves it up to them how to organize that. As I
found out on my first day at the garden in 2014, these rules prioritize use and
sharing.
In the spring of 2014, I heard from a friend in Hyde Park about the 65th
Street and Kumunda Gardens. I emailed Benja Murphy, the founder and
coordinator of the garden and showed up as instructed at the Kumunda
Garden on a cool evening in late April. Only two plots remained, and there
was one other potential gardener. Benja said that I had been the first to email,
which gave me first pick. As we walked around, Benja told us about the two
plots. One, toward the back of the garden, was the site of the compost pile
the season before. It was overgrown, but I figured that tearing up the weeds
and grass would reveal rich soil. The other plot, closer to the street, had
some concrete in it, perhaps from the foundation of a house that had been on

100. Id.; Interview with Meg Mass, supra note 97.
101. See Rachel Schipull, No Weeds in Our Yards: How Chicago’s Landscaping
Ordinance Can Result in Big Fines and What AUA is Doing to Help, ADVOC. FOR URB. AGRIC.
(Feb.
19,
2015),
http://auachicago.org/2015/02/19/no-weeds-in-our-yards/
[https://perma.cc/Z4B5-C65G].
102. Interview with Corenna Rooseboom, Founder, McKinley Park Cmty. Garden, in Chi.,
Ill. (June 2, 2014) (on file with author).
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the site. Benja was not sure about this, but assured me and the other gardener
had the site tested for lead and other contaminants and that it had been
cleared. I felt a bit guilty about taking the better spot, but exercised my
apparent right to take first pick.
I gave Benja the use fee, $40 in cash, and signed the usage agreement.
Benja showed us around the garden’s shared spaces. The drip irrigation
system was not functioning just yet; it needed some repairs. A tool shed was
nearly finished, built by Benja out of scrap wood and with hardware that he
had purchased with the garden’s common fund. He said he would stock it
with tools—including a special wrench to open the fire hydrant, which
provided the water for the garden— and put a combination lock on it, which
would have the same code as the lock on the gate at the front of the garden.
Behind the shed were a few wheelbarrows, also locked up with a
combination lock, for which gardeners knew the code. He also pointed out
a strip of land just outside the fence, along the sidewalk, which was for
planting crops that people from the community, who were not members of
the garden, could pick and use.103
At this first meeting, Benja told me and the other new gardener that it was
our responsibility to get the plot planted by June 1, or we would lose both
our fee for the year and the use of the plot. This use-it-or-lose-it rule appears
in the garden usage agreement.104 At the time, as an eager first-year
gardener, it didn’t seem like that big of a deal. The following weekend, I
was back at the garden with a friend visiting from out of town. We built a
frame for a raised garden bed with some planks I had bought at Home Depot.
The next week, I filled the frame with about a dozen wheelbarrow loads of
rich black compost from the pile that had been dumped at the back of the
garden. The week after that, seeds and seedlings were in the ground. By June
1, I had more kale and chard than I could manage to give away.
Later in the season, I helped one of the garden coordinators repossess a
plot that either had never been planted or had been abandoned. It was next
to mine, and for months I had been watching its weeds grow ever higher,
wondering if the gardener would come back to reclaim the space. Instead,
one afternoon the coordinator enlisted me to help her pull out the weeds, after
asking me whether I’d ever seen anyone there. I hadn’t. Before we began

103. See also Finding Common Ground, CHI. WKLY. 3 (May 26, 2010),
http://www.chicagoweekly.org/2010/05/26/finding-common-ground-south-siders-shareplots-and-plans-at-the-65th-and-woodlawn-community-garden/.
104. See Kumunda Garden Usage Agreement (on file with author). The 65th and
Woodlawn community garden has a very similar agreement, with an added option to volunteer
to maintain a 100-square-foot section of the “free for all” garden outside that garden’s fence.
See Usage Agreement for the 65th & Woodlawn Community Garden, 65TH AND WOODLAWN,
www.65thandwoodlawn.com/images/2012_usage_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YKPGY5P].
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yanking weeds from the ground, we pushed them aside, searching for hints
of food crops that might be hidden underneath. We saw a squash vine or
two, but nothing that suggested activity this season—the vine could have
been from the year before. So we pulled the weeds and planted seedlings for
late-season crops that would go to the church food pantry.
The following spring, the use-it-or-lose-it rule about which I had been so
nonchalant the year before nearly came back to bite me. My wife was back
in town—the previous year she had been away doing her own fieldwork—
and we wanted to prepare the garden together. Early in the spring, we
planted some seeds in trays at our apartment, and put them next to the only
window that received direct light. The seedlings came up, frustratingly slow.
We waited to plant until we could find a weekend when we both would be
free to do so and the weather cooperated.
Weekends came and went. Between two busy schedules, a wet spring,
and a lot of travel to attend to my aging father, it soon was mid-May and we
hadn’t planted a seed. With the rule hanging over us, we eventually rushed
out to put some seedlings that we had bought into the ground. Having made
our use of our plot apparent, we planted a few remaining seedlings outside
the fence, in the common area. This didn’t feel like claiming land for the
commons; if anything, we were ensuring our claim to our individual plot, to
prevent it from reverting to the commons.
In this and other respects, Kumunda Garden operates less like a
community governing a commons, than a collection of individuals tending
their own plots and doing the necessary to keep up the common areas. One
might think of it more like a condominium complex than a fishery. All of
the plots are rented to individuals, and the fence ringing the garden is meant
to keep out non-members (even if the mounds of wood chips makes it easy
to jump). Although I have often heard people in the community garden
movement decry fences and locked gates, the members of the Kumunda
Garden receive emails reminding them to lock the gate behind them, and to
be aware of people who jump the fence to pick free vegetables.105
As in a condominium complex, there are shared spaces and tasks in the
Kumunda Garden (as there are in other gardens that are set up allotmentstyle). The usage agreement provides that gardeners are responsible for
maintaining weed-free paths, for putting compost in the right places, and for
chipping in with work to keep common spaces well-tended. Yet unlike the
use-it-or-lose-it rule, it is harder to enforce cooperation by other gardeners.
Instead, gardeners are reminded of the rules at meetings and in emails and
are encouraged to come to community work days. I have not heard of people

105. See E-mail from 65th & Woodlawn Community Garden Organizers to Kumunda
Gardeners, (Jul. 24, 2015) (on file with author).
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having lost their plots because they free ride on the communal work of other
gardeners.
4.

The Broader Context of Sharing

Much of the sharing at the Kumunda Garden takes place in the context of
resources made available or regulated by the city. Highly active gardeners
and their advocates often seek to influence these rules to create a context that
facilitates community gardening, but most gardeners in the city are more
rule-takers than rule-makers. Water and compost provide two key examples
of how the common governance of a community garden like Kumunda is
possible because of rules developed at a municipal scale.
Chicago is a temperate climate, relatively favorable for three-season food
gardening.106 But even in such a favorable climate, weeks can pass without
regular rain. Community gardens like Kumunda would not exist without a
source of water for irrigation. At Kumunda, like many other gardens in
Chicago, water is provided from a city fire hydrant, which is fitted with a
special adapter that connects to a garden hose.107 This runs about a hundred
feet down the block, and can be used to replenish a bathtub-sized tank that
gardeners use to fill watering cans, or may be connected directly to the
garden’s drip irrigation system.108
For gardens like Kumunda, then, the possibility of using and sharing such
a space of production depends on the City of Chicago’s program to provide
water from hydrants.109 Gardeners must apply to the city’s Department of
Water Management for temporary use of a hydrant.110 As a result, the
creation of a new community garden, or the continuing use of an ongoing
one, effectively requires the approval of either the City of Chicago’s
Department of Water Management or the donation of water from a neighbor.

106. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s plant hardiness zone map classifies Chicago as
Zone 6a. See USDA Plant Hardiness Zone Map, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: AGRIC. RESEARCH
SERV., http://planthardiness.ars.usda.gov/PHZMWeb/ [https://perma.cc/VDB8-7FTQ]. This
allows for growing from roughly mid-March through mid-November. See Dave Donovan,
Gardening Zone 6, LOVE TO KNOW, http://garden.lovetoknow.com/wiki/Gardening_Zone_6
[https://perma.cc/J4ST-Y5FN].
107. This setup can be seen using Google Maps’ Street View feature, in front of 6427 S.
Kimbark
Avenue.
See
Google
Street
View
(Sept.
2015),
https://www.google.com/maps/place/6427+S+Kimbark+Ave,+Chicago,+IL+60637/@41.77
78163,-87.5945811,3a,75y,79.27h,82.55t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sSn5Axci0Sp4HcS2kpcNyQ!2e0!4m2!3m1!1s0x880e291e80850b45:0xb36f6eb458bc3b82
[https://perma.cc/6R5K-RA78].
108. See id.
109. See Chicago Water Hydrant Policy, CHI. COMMUNITY GARDENERS ASS’N (April 1,
2015), http://chicagocommunitygardens.org/resources/chicago-water-hydrant-policy/.
110. See id.
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Self-organization of a garden does not simply happen, but occurs when and
where a city official or a friendly neighbor gives it the green light.
Providing permanent access to water is one of the major expenses that
NeighborSpace covers for community gardens for which it holds title to the
lands in trust.111 A connection to the municipal water system costs thousands
of dollars, which NeighborSpace covers from its budget.112 To have such
resources made available on a permanent basis again requires the approval
of an alderman, since it is only at the alderman’s discretion that the city
council will transfer land from its inventory to NeighborSpace.113
As with water, gardens such as Kumunda could not exist without soil or
compost. In Chicago, as in many other post-industrial U.S. cities,
community gardeners often assume that all soil is contaminated by lead or
other heavy metals.114 Although people sometimes grow directly in the
ground, experts advise reducing the risk of contamination by planting in
raised beds with clean soil, or bringing in clean soil and compost from other
locations.115
Buying soil, of course, can be incredibly expensive. This cost increases
the attractiveness of producing one’s own soil by composting household
organic waste. Yet, until the City Council passed a composting ordinance in
mid 2015, gardeners were prohibited from bringing food scraps and other
compostable materials from their homes onto community gardens.116 At

111. See Chicago, USA: Community-Managed Open Space, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL
ENVTL.
INITIATIVES,
ICLEI
Case
Study
No.
61,
2
(Aug.
2001),
https://casesimportal.newark.rutgers.edu/storage/documents/community_service/public/case
/NeighborSpace.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PSY-YRKP].
112. See id.
113. Known as “aldermanic privilege,” this is a key part of the customary but unwritten
power of aldermen in Chicago. See Christopher Thale, Aldermanic Privilege, ELEC.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
CHI.
(2005),
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2197.html
[https://perma.cc/SP5AB2PE].
114. See Starter Kit: Environmental Best Practices for Chicago Community Gardens, CHI.
COMMUNITY
GARDENERS
ASS’N
(2016),
http://chicagocommunitygardens.org/resources/environment-and-safety/starter-kitenvironmental-best-practices-for-chicago-community-gardens/
[https://perma.cc/ZZ4SHXSB].
115. See generally Laura Witzling, Michelle Wander & Ellen Phillips, Testing and
Educating on Urban Soil Lead: A Case of Chicago Community Gardens, 1 J. AGRIC., FOOD
SYS., & COMMUNITY DEV. 3 (2011).
116. City Council Approves Ordinance to Expand Citywide Composting Program, CITY OF
CHI.
(July
29,
2015),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdph/provdrs/environmental_permitsregulation/
news/2015/july/city-council-approves-ordinance-to-expand-citywide-composting-pr.html
[https://perma.cc/9KNE-P]; see also MUN. CODE OF CHI., Chapter 7-28, Sec. 11-4-040,
Chapter 17-9, http://auachicago.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/chicago-compost-substituteordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UEC-STUG].
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least officially, this limited gardeners’ ability to make their own soil. At the
Kumunda Garden, growers received an email in early 2015 reminding them
that this was not an option, and that the compost piles were to be used only
for things produced in the garden.117
The 2015 ordinance permitting community gardeners to use household
materials for composting came in response to pressure by Advocates for
Urban Agriculture (AUA) and the Chicago Food Policy Action Council
(CFPAC), the two main urban agriculture advocacy organizations.118 The
rule changes permit community gardeners and urban farmers to compost
food scraps and organic waste collected from off-site sources and establish
a permitting system for nonprofit organizations to start community
composting centers.119
5.

Gleaning in the Garden

Even if they tend crops in individual plots, members of community
gardens generally share community spaces and many are involved in
programs that share some of the garden’s produce. At gardens run by the
Peterson Garden Project on Chicago’s North Side, this takes the form of
raised beds that are designated as part of a “Grow2Give” program in which
five percent of garden harvests go to food pantries or nutrition programs.120
The 65th & Woodlawn and Kumunda gardens maintain a strip of land
between the sidewalk and the fence, with vegetables that are free for passersby to pick. At these gardens, members have also developed a different way
to share the bounty: gleaning programs that harvest and distribute a portion
of the produce from members’ individual plots.
The gleaning program at 65th & Woodlawn first came about as a result of
conversations between the garden’s founder and a member of the KAM
Isaiah Israel (KAMII) Temple in Kenwood.121 Robert Nevel, the founder of
KAMII’s gardening programs, had ripped up some of the lawn around the
synagogue, and replaced it with gardens where food was grown for donation
to nearby shelters. Having run out of space to expand around the synagogue,

117. E-mail from 65th & Woodlawn Cmty. Garden Organizers to Kumunda Gardeners
(May 21, 2015) (on file with author).
118. A New Day for Composting in Chicago, ADVOC. FOR URB. AGRIC. (Aug. 14, 2015),
http://auachicago.org/2015/08/14/a-new-day-for-composting-in-chicago/
[https://perma.cc/NW88-S5UV]. This campaign received a push from the fact that many of
CFPAC and AUA’s leaders work with commercial farms in Chicago, which have a financial
interest in making sure that they are permitted to bring off-site materials for composting.
119. See id.
120. Programs,
PETERSON
GARDEN
PROJECT,
http://salsa.petersongarden.org/p/salsa/web/common/public/content?content_item_KEY=99
57 [https://perma.cc/QEZ5-WP74].
121. Interview with Benjamin Murphy, supra note 81.
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he began thinking about ways that the congregation could help provide more
fresh produce to local food pantries. He proposed to the founder of the 65th
and Woodlawn garden that they set up a gleaning program, which would
gather produce fruits and vegetables from community gardens in the
neighborhood.122
The KAMII White Rock Gleaning Program took its name from the
practice of leaving a white rock in a garden plot to signal that the gardener
was okay with having gleaners from the congregation take some of the
produce during their weekly gleaning visits; a gardener could alternatively
place a survey flag in their plot to signal a decision to not participate.123 By
the time I gleaned with the KAMII group in the fall of 2014, florescent
orange survey flags had taken the place of white rocks, and what had begun
as an opt-in system had become an opt-out one. Fellow gleaners explained
that this was because the stakes were easier to see, and because many
gardeners did not seem to understand that they needed to put a rock or a flag
in the plot in order to share.
Nevel and others from KAMII cite verses from the Torah as a moral basis
for gleaning.124 At their 2014 Food Justice weekend, annually held on Martin
Luther King Jr. day, a youth educator from the congregation held a workshop
on Jewish law concerning gleaning and the sharing of agricultural surpluses.
Of particular interest was Leviticus 19:11, which instructs farmers not to
harvest the corners of their fields.125 Nevel interprets verses such as these as
moral justification for taking some of what other people grow. In a talk
before the 2014 American Community Gardening Association conference in
Chicago, he asked whether it was chayil to harvest carrots from an
abandoned plot, and give them to a nearby shelter.126 Property scholar
Joseph Singer has written about his interpretation of Torah law which draws
on the Old Testament to develop a broader argument concerning the social

122. Id.; Robert Nevel, President, KAM Isaiah Israel Synagogue, Address at the American
Community Gardening Association Pre-Conference Event (Aug. 7, 2014).
123. See Our Garden, KAM ISAIAH ISRAEL CONGREGATION, https://kamii.org/content/ourgarden (last visited Aug. 4, 2016)
124. Robert Nevel, supra note 123.
125. KAMII members are not alone in interpreting these verses as having contemporary
relevance concerning the duty to the poor. See, e.g., Jeffrey Spitzer, Pe’ah: The Corners of
Our
Fields,
MYJEWISHLEARNING
(July
24,
2003),
http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/peah-the-corners-of-our-fields/
[https://perma.cc/T47V-YQJV].
126. Robert Nevel, supra note 123. Chayil is a Hebrew word that takes on various
meanings in Jewish texts, such as valor, bravery, and strength. The poem Eshet Chayil,
Proverbs 31:10–31, describes the woman of valor, who among other things plants a vineyard
and gives generously to the poor.
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obligations inherent in property law;127 on the South Side of Chicago,
gardeners are doing something similar to inculcate a culture and practice of
sharing the produce of community gardens.
Nevel and other KAMII members have worked to spread their ideas about
gleaning and to help other gardens develop similar policies.128 Other gardens
have joined the KAMII gleaning program,129 and Jewish religious educators
who attended a convention for cantors at KAMII in 2015 learned about the
gleaning program and other ways in which congregants in Chicago were
applying Torah teachings to guide their gardening programs.130
The KAMII gleaning program at the 65th & Woodlawn garden also
inspired a similar program at the Kumunda Garden. At Kumunda, however,
the gleaning is not coordinated by KAMII, and the produce goes to a
different food pantry. As a coordinator of the Kumunda Garden explained
to me, this was because when garden organizers from 65th & Woodlawn
asked First Presbyterian for more land for a new garden, it came on the
condition that any food gleaned from the new garden go to the church’s own
food pantry, rather than to other destinations.131
During the 2014 season, these two gleaning programs ran in parallel, one
block from each other. I gleaned with each organization, and found that the
KAMII program was run like a machine. A team of a half-dozen gleaners
swiftly moved from plot to plot and garden to garden, stopping back at the
synagogue to weigh the gleanings for record-keeping and promotional
purposes before distributing the vegetables to food pantries and senior
centers in Kenwood and Woodlawn. At Kumunda, the gleaning program
was more bare-bones. The garden coordinator carried over some plastic tubs
from the church and picked vegetables with the help of a summer intern and
sometimes a volunteer like myself.
In both cases, however, the act of gleaning involves the application of
expertise, and constant judgment calls. Is this tomato ripe enough to pick?
How many tomatoes is ten percent of the harvest from this plot? Is this
overgrown plot abandoned, or simply ill-tended? If this plot is overgrown
but has a survey flag in it, should we respect the opt-out signal? Old

127. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS
OF OWNERSHIP 42–56 (2000).
128. Nevel often shares the experience of the KAMII gleaning program at events for
community gardeners. See, e.g., Robert Nevel, Address at AUA Spring Gathering: Sharing
the Harvest (May 15, 2013), http://auachicago.org/2013/05/01/save-the-date-aua-springgathering-on-may-15/ [https://perma.cc/7U4Y-63WX].
129. One example is the community garden at 62nd Street and Dorchester Avenue in
Woodlawn. See 62GARDEN, http://62garden.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2016).
130. Hazzan Arlyne Unger, Notes from Hazzan Arlyne Unger, 11 RUACH! NEWSLETTER OF
BETH TIKVAH B’NAI JESHURUN 4 (June 2015).
131. Interview with Meg Mass, supra note 97.
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Testament verses may help justify gleaning as an ethical practice, but they
do not resolve the many questions of how to glean in practice. For that, new
gleaners such as myself would appeal to people who had more experience,
sometimes stopping together to consider the state of a garden plot before
taking part of its bounty, or passing it over and moving on to the next.
***
New ways of governing land are emerging in Chicago’s community
gardens, but seldom through conscious efforts to govern them as a commons.
Instead, people tinker with ways of making land available, and regulating its
use. Some of the forms of regulation developed by growers, such as garden
usage agreements and gleaning programs, are more easily conceived of in
terms of self-organization. But gardeners also draw on rules and norms
available at different scales such as municipal ordinances, aldermanic
policies, even rules from religious texts. They experiment with these rules,
seeing what works for gardeners, and what does not, sometimes trying to
change higher-order rules such as composting ordinances, which would
enable greater sharing of resources. They also experiment with ways to
strike a balance between exclusive use and obligation to others, giving
gardeners the expectation that they will have most, but maybe not all, of the
fruits of their labors.
B.

Growing Home Urban Farm

Urban farms, like community gardens, offer sites for experimentation
with governing urban land as a shared, productive resource. Some social
scientists have also suggested that they are a way to reclaim the commons.
Geographer Nathan McClintock argues that “urban agriculture has served as
a rallying point for radical structural critiques and the reclamation of the
commons,”132 and has proposed that vacant (or “fallow”) public land in
Oakland might be treated as a commons, with larger sites run by urban
agriculture organizations as “mini-farms,” or leased directly to commercial
urban farmers.133 Urban agriculture, McClintock argues, has become “about
more than simply gardening,” with many growers “demanding rights-based
changes to the food system and an increased focus on ‘entitlements,
structural reforms to markets and property regimes, and class-based
redistributive demands for land.’”134

132. McClintock, supra note 2, at 154.
133. McClintock & Cooper, supra note 1, at 13.
134. McClintock, supra note 2, at 154 (quoting Eric Holt-Giménez & Annie Shattuck,
Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of
Transformation?, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 109, 114 (2011)).
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Walking up to Growing Home Urban Farm, in Chicago’s south-side
Englewood neighborhood, you might not immediately recognize it as a
structural reform to the city’s property regime. Instead, you might first see
other structures: hoop houses, long tube-like temporary greenhouses built
from curved metal poles and clear plastic sheeting, sheltering trellised
tomato vines and rows of kale. On a summer day, you might also see a group
of workers—many of them job trainees—weeding the rows, prepping new
beds for planting, or cleaning harvested vegetables.
It may not be immediately apparent how Growing Home’s founders
experimented with property relations to develop this farm. But it is thanks
to their tinkering that the farm is here, on two half-acre parcels on either side
of an abandoned railroad embankment.135 To understand whether it makes
sense to think of Growing Home as an urban commons requires mapping
how people brought it about, and how it has fostered new ways of governing
the use of urban land.
1.

The Saga of Surplus Land

Growing Home’s roots extend back to a plan to claim a prime piece of
lakefront property in downtown Chicago. At the end of 1988, the Chicago
Coalition for the Homeless (CCH) received a memo from the National
Coalition for the Homeless, explaining that a recent court order had directed
the federal government to make unused property available for use by the
homeless.136 A month later, an inventory of available properties arrived,
including one listed as “Chicago Moorings.”137
Lester Brown, a program associate with CCH, was interested in the
leverage the McKinney Act offered.138 The Chicago Moorings property, a
former Coast Guard facility, was a nearly ½-acre piece of prime lakefront
property. It was located where the Chicago River meets Lake Michigan, at
the base of Navy Pier, which was slated to be redeveloped as a massive

135. Google Maps offers a view of Growing Home’s farms on either side of South Honore
Street.
See
Google
Maps
Street
View
(2016),
https://www.google.com/maps/place/5834+S+Honore+St,+Chicago,+IL+60636/@41.78750
04,87.6700342,18z/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x880e2e4584c817db:0x333e43182812d734
[https://perma.cc/E4KU-2LPE].
136. Memorandum from Maria Foscarinis & Tim Leshan, Nat’l Coal. for the Homeless to
Bd. of Dirs. and State Coals. (Dec. 15, 1988) (on file with author). This and other archival
documents cited in this section are in Growing Home’s organizational archives, which were
generously made available to the author.
137. U.S. GOV’T PROP. NOTICE OF DETERMINATION OF HOMELESS SUITABILITY, DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. DIV. OF HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING, (Jan. 9, 1989) (on file
with author).
138. Form letter from Les Brown, Program Assoc., Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to
potential supporters (Apr. 1, 1992) (on file with author).
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tourist attraction.139 The McKinney Act’s prioritization of land for use by
organizations that serve the homeless seemed to have the potential to trump
local regulations which might otherwise bar use of such a site.140
Brown developed a plan for how CCH might use the property. He
proposed building several greenhouses on the site, in which homeless clients
could learn job skills as they grew fresh herbs for nearby gourmet
restaurants.141 As he noted in a letter asking for support from the Center for
Neighborhood Technology, which had developed a greenhouse attached to
the First Presbyterian Church in Woodlawn: “Obviously we will face great
opposition from the City, the Park District, and the people behind the
Lakefront Protection Ordinance. I think, however, that the idea of a
greenhouse and jobs for homeless people would be more difficult to oppose
than a shelter.”142 Brown also realized that the claim to the property was
likely to turn into a bargaining chip with the city, rather than actually turning
into a project at the lakefront site. “Given the location and value of the
property,” he wrote in a letter asking for support from other organizations,
“we expect to encounter considerable opposition from a number of sources.
However, we feel strongly that we, at least, will be in a position to leverage
other funds and resources should we be unable to develop the proposed
program.”143
Exactly what might be achieved by using this leverage was an open
question. Brown and CCH set the experiment in motion, eager to see what
they might get in return for their claim to the property. As expected, the city
resisted the land being given to CCH, and filed its own application for the
property.144 Over the next eighteen months, the General Services Agency
mediated negotiations between city officials and the CCH.145 Throughout,
CCH maintained that the McKinney Act gave them a valid claim to the land,
while city officials affirmed that a claim could not be made to land that would

139. See Navy Pier Re-development Planning, ROULA ARCHITECTS (1990),
http://www.roularchitects.com/navy-pier.html [https://perma.cc/KL77-WSHD].
140. A copy of a letter that the Chicago Coalition from the Homeless received argued that
“the McKinney Act preempts state and local zoning requirements that conflict with that Act.”
Letter from Maria Foscarinis, Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness and Poverty, to Olivette
Simmons Simpson, Dev. Officer, N.J. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Agency (Oct. 4, 1990) (on file
with author).
141. Letter from Les Brown, Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Lou Kreinberg, Ctr. for
Neighborhood Tech. (Mar. 23, 1992) (on file with author).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 30.
144. Growing Home, Timeline: Nave Pier Moorings Site, Negotiations for Land Swap, and
Agreement to Allow Growing Home to Sell Property (Oct. 2004) (on file with author).
145. Id.
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violate local zoning and lakefront land use restrictions.146 The city proposed
that if CCH dropped its claim to the Moorings site, it would transfer a
different piece of city-owned land for the greenhouse project, as well as
helping CCH apply for grants to support the program.147 CCH rejected the
city’s initial list of alternative sites and submitted criteria that any alternative
location would have to meet.148 CCH also tested a number of different
proposals, including creating a line in the city budget dedicated to supporting
the greenhouse program, an annual fee on leases at the new Navy Pier
Development that would fund low-income housing, and assistance from the
city in getting local restaurants to source their produce from the greenhouse
project.149
By the fall of 1993, the city and CCH had reached the outline of a deal: in
exchange for CCH dropping its claim to the Chicago Moorings site, the city
would sell it a piece of vacant city-owned land on the near southwest side
for $10, give it priority in applying for grants, provide a no-cost lease for a
produce stand at Navy Pier, and provide other assistance.150 The deal nearly
stumbled over a final hurdle when the alderman for the ward in which the
alternative property was located objected to the transfer; CCH responded by
telling city officials they would need to have Mayor Daley prevail upon the
alderman or CCH would move to have the federal government decide on its
application for the Moorings site.151 Ultimately, the transfer of the land went
through.152
From 1996 to 2001, CCH worked on developing a greenhouse project at
the site on Fourteenth Street. But in the process, CCH discovered that the
land was contaminated; the city’s due diligence prior to CCH taking
ownership had not been sufficiently rigorous.153 At the beginning of 2001,

146. See Letter from Richard Wendy, Deputy Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev.,
to John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless (Sept. 3, 1992) (on file with
author).
147. See id.
148. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Richard
Wendy, Deputy Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (Oct. 14, 1992) (on file with
author).
149. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Earl
Jones, Comm’r, Fed. Prop. Res. Serv. (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from John
Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Valerie B. Jarrett, Comm’r of the
Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (Apr. 29, 1993) (on file with author).
150. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Valerie
B. Jarrett, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (June 24, 1993) (on file with author).
151. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Valerie
B. Jarrett, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (Dec. 6, 1993) (on file with author).
152. See Agreement for the Sale and Redevelopment of Land (no. 96343341) (May 6,
1996) (on file with author).
153. See Interview with Laura Tilly, Bd. Member, Growing Home, in Chi., Ill. (July 15,
2015) (on file with author).
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the city said that it did not have the money to cover the costs of remediating
the contamination, which were estimated at $150,000.154 This left CCH
holding a liability: a contaminated parcel of land that by the terms of its
transfer from the city could only be used for homeless services.155 CCH
negotiated with the city for the right to sell the property, instead, and take the
money from the sale.156 The city agreed, and after a couple years of looking,
Growing Home was able to find a buyer who paid over $900,000 for the site
at the end of 2004.157 Over a decade into the experiment to see what could
be gained from the sliver on the river, this gave Growing Home, the nonprofit
organization that CCH had spun off to run the greenhouse project, a tidy sum
of money. But it still had no land on which to build a farm in Chicago.
2.

Coming to Englewood

While city officials were still willing to transfer land to Growing Home
for the project, their attention soon turned to Englewood, where a quality-oflife planning process was underway.158 The plan proposed to “[d]evelop an
urban agriculture district to provide business, job training and employment
opportunities while improving the availability of fresh produce.”159
This was a new vision for Englewood, which as one community organizer
put it to me, replaced Woodlawn in being perceived by city officials and
urban planners as the most troubled neighborhood in the city and most in
need of interventions.160 Englewood, which the media has focused on
recently for its high crime rates and troubled schools,161 is home to
households that are predominantly African-American and low-income.162
According to data from the City of Chicago, between 2008 and 2012, some

154. Growing Home, Timeline, supra note 145.
155. See Agreement for the Sale and Redevelopment of Land, supra note 153.
156. Growing Home, Timeline, supra note 145.
157. Id.
158. See generally ENGLEWOOD: MAKING A DIFFERENCE, TEAMWORK ENGLEWOOD &
LISC/CHICAGO’S
NEW
COMMUNITIES
PROGRAM
(Dec.
2005),
http://www.newcommunities.org/cmadocs/englewoodsummaryplan_12-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3K7F-6JS5].
159. Id.
160. See L. Anton Seals, Comments during Social Justice Bicycle Ride of Woodlawn and
Englewood (Aug. 2, 2014).
161. See, e.g., This American Life: Harper High School Part One, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/487/harper-highschool-part-one [https://perma.cc/9GYV-3T9W].
162. In the 2010 census, residents of census tracts in Englewood and West Englewood were
97–98% African-American. See Matthew Bloch, Amanda Cox & Tim Giratikanon, Mapping
Segregation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jul.
8,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/08/us/census-race-map.html
[https://perma.cc/6L3U-T5AU].
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46% of households in the Englewood community area had incomes below
the federal poverty line, and 28% of residents over age sixteen were
unemployed.163 From 2010–2014, 58% of children in Englewood lived in
poverty.164
Englewood has also been the site of incredible disinvestment and
depopulation over the past several decades. Once a vibrant commercial
center, second only to the downtown Loop,165 it is now a landscape marked
by vacant lots. In the fall of 2015, the City owned over 1600 vacant
properties in Englewood, totaling 153 acres or 7.7% of the total land area.166
Several thousand more vacant lots are privately owned.167
As in Woodlawn, this landscape is the product of successive waves of
depopulation and disinvestment. In 1930, Englewood was an almost entirely
white neighborhood, home to 89,000 people.168 Thirty years later, the
population had risen to over 97,000, but tens of thousands of white residents
had already left; the population was now 69% African-American.169 Since
1960, Englewood has lost over two-thirds of its population, and by 2010 it
was home to just over 30,000 people, of whom 97% were AfricanAmerican.170
This decades-long exodus has prompted city planners to reimagine what
Englewood might look like, working on the assumption that the population

163. See CENSUS DATA – SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CHICAGO, 2008–2012,
CITY OF CHI. DATA PORTAL (2011), https://data.cityofchicago.org/Health-HumanServices/Census-Data-Selected-socioeconomic-indicators-in-C/kn9c-c2s2
[https://perma.cc/67UT-MLA7]. Other residents have likely stopped looking for work and
thus are not officially counted as unemployed. In the West Englewood community area, which
is often considered part of “Greater Englewood,” things are little better: 34% of households
fell below the poverty line, and 35% of residents over sixteen years old were unemployed. Id.
164. Population and Poverty Data by Chicago Community Area, ILL. ACTION FOR
CHILDREN
(Dec.
2014),
http://www.actforchildren.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/2014_Census_Data_by_Chicago_Community_Area.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XZJ-AAT8].
165. See Clinton E. Stockwell, Englewood, ELEC. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005),
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/426.html
[https://perma.cc/V647MYJZ].
166. Author’s analysis based on data downloaded on Oct. 3, 2015 from the City of Chicago.
See
City-Owned
Land
Inventory,
CITY
OF
CHI.
(2011),
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Community-Economic-Development/City-Owned-LandInventory/aksk-kvfp [https://perma.cc/P3AY-RMKA].
167. GREEN HEALTHY NEIGHBORHOODS, CITY OF CHI. DEP’T OF PLAN. & DEV. (Mar. 20,
2014),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/green-healthyneighborhoods.html [https://perma.cc/FSM5-RMVN].
168. See Stockwell, supra note 166.
169. Id.
170. City of Chicago Census 2010 and 2000, supra note 74; ILL. ACTION FOR CHILDREN,
supra note 165.
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will only increase at a low rate over the next twenty-five years.171
Reimagining possible uses for land after disinvestment has created
opportunities for expansion and profit. A large swath of the east side of the
neighborhood has been leveled to make way for an expansion of the Norfolk
Southern intermodal rail yard, which increases Chicago’s capacity to import
goods that were manufactured overseas.172
Meanwhile, a spur railroad line, which once served light industrial firms
along 59th Street, sits abandoned.173 City planners have imagined building a
fitness trail on the abandoned embankment,174 akin to the recently opened
606 trail that links neighborhoods on Chicago’s north side.175
In the wake of the quality of life planning process, the City transferred a
piece of land on the north side of this railroad embankment to Growing
Home.176 This became the Wood Street urban farm.177 Following Les
Brown’s vision and the hopes of the community plan, the farm’s primary
goal is to provide job training for people transitioning out of homelessness
and incarceration.178 Growing food offers a context for training people who
have barriers to employment in the basic skills of being a worker: how to
arrive on time and attend to detailed (and potentially repetitive) tasks.
Growing Home also works with partners to help its trainees seal or expunge
their criminal records.179 In so doing, it is addressing the barriers to labor
market entry and mobility that mass incarceration has created for residents
of neighborhoods like Englewood.180 If land for the farm is the byproduct of
historic disinvestment in communities like Englewood, then its labor force
171. See GREEN HEALTHY NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 168, at 49–51.
172. See generally Intermodalism – Metropolitan Chicago’s Built-In Economic
Advantage,
CHI.
METRO.
AGENCY
FOR
PLAN.
(May
1,
2015),
http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/about/updates//asset_publisher/UIMfSLnFfMB6/content/intermodalism-metropolitan-chicago-s-built-ineconomic-advantage [https://perma.cc/RL2M-WFZB].
173. See Hitchcock Design Group, New ERA Trail Community Vision Plan: A Path for
Transformation,
OPENLANDS
(Aug.
2009),
http://www.openlands.org/filebin/images/plans_reports/Community_Greening_Projects_Ne
w_ERA_Trail_Community_Vision_P.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YR-YPAQ].
174. See GREEN HEALTHY NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 168, at 42.
175. See THE 606, http://www.the606.org/ [https://perma.cc/TA7C-AYQQ].
176. See Chi. City Council, Comm. on Housing and Real Estate, Approval for Negotiated
Sale of City-Owned Property at 5814 South Wood Street and Authorization for Execution of
Redevelopment Agreement with Growing Home, Inc., J. OF THE CHI. CITY COUNCIL 6658–88
(Sept. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
177. See Our Farms, GROWING HOME, http://growinghomeinc.org/our-farms/
[https://perma.cc/6B7S-JPQM].
178. See
About
Us, GROWING HOME,
http://growinghomeinc.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/KUW6-WKRX].
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 541 (2002).
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might be thought of as the byproduct of mass incarceration, with trainees’
modest stipends underwritten by grants from city and state agencies and
charitable foundations that aim to facilitate reentry into society by formerly
incarcerated people.181
3.

From Ownership to Trust

After receiving the parcel on Wood Street from the city, Growing Home
sought to put up a building on the site for its offices, processing facility, and
classroom.182 To do so, the organization’s leaders planned to use their
newly-owned land as collateral for a loan.183 But when lenders did their due
diligence into the property, they found evidence of contamination.184 Once
again, it turned out that Growing Home had failed to find that the site the
city had sold them was polluted; this complicated the process of receiving a
loan.185 But this time, rather than selling the property, Growing Home
managed to get support from the city to cover the costs of remediation.186
The loan, and the construction, went forward.187
Growing Home’s twelve-year saga to find land on which to build a farm
illustrates how ownership of land can be as much a curse as it is a blessing.
Receiving city-owned properties can come cheap, but also involve taking on
hidden liabilities. The city has twice transferred land to Growing Home that
turned out to be contaminated.188 This forced the farm’s leaders to either
figure out a way to move on to another site or to find the money needed to
clean up the contamination. Yet, for raising money through a mortgage or
having the ability to custom-build a permanent structure, ownership of a site
is essential.
When Growing Home’s staff sought to expand to a parcel across the
embankment, on Honore Street, they decided to try something different.
Rather than taking ownership of the land from the city, they figured out a
181. Trainees earn up to $3500 over the course of a fourteen-week training program. See
2014
Annual
Report
Employment,
GROWING
HOME
http://growinghomeinc.org/report2014/employment.html [https://perma.cc/E2Z6-UXYH].
Growing Home has recently received major grants from the City of Chicago Department of
Family and Support Services and the Illinois Department of Corrections, in addition to a wide
range of foundations. See 2014 Annual Report - Grants, GROWING HOME,
http://growinghomeinc.org/report2014/grants.html [https://perma.cc/9XE7-EPGN]; Annual
Report 2012–2013, GROWING HOME, http://growinghomeinc.org/docs/GrowingHome1213AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWB4-BZ3F].
182. Interview with Laura Tilly, supra note 154.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 154, 185 and accompanying text.
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way to have the parcel transferred from the city to NeighborSpace, and then
to lease the land from the land trust. Up until that point, NeighborSpace had
only held land for community gardens—holding land for a commercial,
albeit nonprofit, farm was a new proposition. It prompted discussions among
the NeighborSpace board to decide whether such a land use fell within its
mission of community-managed open space.189
Ultimately, the board agreed that the deal could go forward without
amending the land trust’s bylaws. In the process, the board developed rough
criteria for holding land for urban farms: a farm would be run by a not-forprofit organization, it could not be an indoor farm or involve any permanent
structures on the site (though hoop houses are permissible), and the site could
not be too big.190 According to NeighborSpace’s Executive Director, this
last criterion remains somewhat vague and depends on the context of a
site.191
City officials, of course, also had to be willing to transfer land to a trust,
rather than directly to a farming organization. But from their perspective,
NeighborSpace’s ownership of the land helps solve some of the problems
concerning site preparation, since the land trust can help coordinate and
fundraise for environmental testing and any needed remediation.192 Since
remediation can be a significant investment—in the range of several hundred
thousand dollars—knowing that the land will remain in trust and be used for
open space, even if a nonprofit is no longer able to use it, helps to secure the
public investment in preparing the land.193
The experiment that began at Honore Street has sparked new thinking
about how vacant land can be governed and put to use. Other projects have
started to follow suit. In East Garfield Park, a low-income, predominantly
African-American neighborhood on Chicago’s West Side, NeighborSpace
now holds 2.6 acres of land for Chicago FarmWorks urban farm, which
grows vegetables for sale at wholesale prices to the Greater Chicago Food
Depository.194
The land trust has come to be seen as a useful tool for expanding the
commercial urban agriculture sector, by holding low-cost land for both

189. Interview with Ben Helphand, Exec. Dir., NeighborSpace, Chi., Ill. (Aug. 22, 2012)
(on file with author).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Interview with Bradley Roback, Econ. Dev. Coordinator, City of Chi. Dep’t of
Planning and Dev., Chi., Ill. (July 25, 2014) (on file with author).
193. Id.
194. See Emily Blum & Chris Lackner, Heartland Human Care Services Breaks Ground
on
West
Side
Urban
Farm,
HEARTLAND
ALL.
(Nov.
14,
2012),
http://www.heartlandalliance.org/news-and-publications/inthenews/press-releases/urbanfarm.html.
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nonprofit and for-profit farms. Foundation officials would like to see urban
farmers move beyond nonprofit business models dependent on grants. In
2014, I spoke with one who was particularly excited by a Baltimore-based
company that prepares sites and builds farms that other organizations can
use, and by a small Chicago company that was developing a similar fee-forservice based model.195 Recently, local foundations have created a joint
program called “Food:Land:Opportunity,” which is funding an effort led by
NeighborSpace to develop a land tenure model that could support for-profit
commercial growers in Englewood.196
This potential new role for NeighborSpace responds to a problem likely
to arise thanks to the growth of programs focused on training new
commercial urban farmers. In 2013, Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced the
Farmers for Chicago program, which committed the city to helping to find
land for farmer trainees from organizations such as Growing Home.197 The
Chicago Botanic Garden and Growing Power have since developed
“incubator farms” where beginning urban farmers can refine their growing
skills, test out their business models, and share equipment and distribution
facilities.198 Yet when the incubation period ends for these new farmers, the
question remains where they might go to establish their farming businesses.
Will they be able to afford land at market rates in the city, or will they have
to move to the country to find land?199
195. Interview with Karen Lehman, Dir., Fresh Taste Funder Initiative, in Chi., Ill., (May
9, 2014) (on file with author).
196. Food:Land:Opportunity,
CHI.
CMTY.
TRUST
(2016),
http://www.cct.org/about/partnerships_initiatives/searle-foodlandopportunity/
[https://perma.cc/49C3-YK6K]. Interest has also been growing around the country in how
the community land trust model, developed for affordable housing, could be adapted to
provide appropriate land tenure models for urban agriculture projects. See generally Greg
Rosenberg & Jeffrey Yuen, Beyond Housing: Urban Agriculture and Commercial
Development by Community Land Trusts (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No.
WP13GR1, 2012).
197. Press Release, City of Chi., Mayor Emanuel Launches New ‘Farmers for Chicago’
Network
for
Chicago
Urban
Farmers
(Mar.
15,
2013),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2013/march_2
013/mayor_emanuel_launchesnewfarmersforchicagonetworkforchicagourban.html
[https://perma.cc/FW75-QBBG].
198. See Gloria Ciaccio, Chicago Botanic Garden’s Beginning Farmers and Ranchers
Development Program Establishes Four Incubator Farms in Year Two of Three-Year
Program,
CHI.
BOTANIC
GARDENS
(Aug.
19,
2014),
http://www.chicagobotanic.org/pr/release/chicago_botanic_garden_establishes_four_incubat
or_farms [https://perma.cc/972N-JG5W]; Farmers for Chicago, GROWING POWER,
http://www.growingpower.org/education/chicago-farms-and-projects/farmers-for-chicago/
[https://perma.cc/W3R6-5WJR].
199. Farm incubator programs elsewhere have confronted difficulties in graduating
trainees onto their own land outside of the program. One of the earliest programs, Intervale
Farms in Burlington, Vermont, faced the problem of letting too many early trainees remain
on the land as “mentors,” which meant there was eventually little land left on which to bring
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The planning process funded by Food:Land:Opportunity sought to
develop a model for giving for-profit urban farmers access to affordable land
in Englewood. As of late 2015, there were many things yet to be worked
out. If land could be made affordable by holding it in trust and leasing to
for-profit farmers, is that something NeighborSpace could do, without
revising its mission? One option that participants in the process have
discussed is the possibility of creating a nonprofit growers’ cooperative that
would lease land from NeighborSpace or another land trust.200 The members
of the cooperative, in turn, could then incorporate using the business form of
their choice, whether as non-profits or as some type of for-profit entity.201
For some community organizers from Englewood who have been
involved in this process, these visions are both promising and troubling. The
promise is clear: a new land tenure model could provide the basis for
investments that would turn some of the neighborhood’s vacant lots into
productive green spaces. But as one organizer explained to me, it was
difficult to imagine supporting a model in which a white-run organization—
such as Growing Home or NeighborSpace—would own land being farmed
by black people; or, for that matter, a model that allowed people who were
not from the neighborhood (or didn’t at least look like the people from the
neighborhood) to benefit from access to low-cost farmland.202 Yet she
acknowledged that it would also be difficult for a land trust for urban
farmland to require that growers have a particular racial background.203
One option would be to prioritize growers from Englewood and nearby
neighborhoods. The city used a somewhat similar strategy in recent
programs that have sold city-owned vacant lots to residents for $1 each.204
Known as the Large Lots programs, these were piloted in Englewood and
West Woodlawn in 2014, and have since expanded to other neighborhoods
where the city owns large numbers of vacant lots.205 To prevent outsiders
from coming into the neighborhoods and buying up land, the Large Lots

new trainees. See Notes on talk by Andrea Tursini from Intervale, NORTHEAST BEGINNING
FARMERS
PROGRAM,
at
2–3
(Oct.
29,
2010)
http://www.nebeginningfarmers.org/files/2012/05/Andrea-Tursini-Farm-Incubatorssc7cbp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W8Q-F87H].
200. Interview with Ben Helphand, Exec. Dir., NeighborSpace, in Chi., Ill. (Aug. 27, 2015)
(on file with author).
201. This model, however, would raise questions about how leasing arrangements between
a land trust, a nonprofit cooperative, and for-profit businesses might affect the tax-exempt
statuses of the land trust and the cooperative.
202. Interview with Sonya Harper, Exec. Dir., Grow Greater Englewood, in Chi., Ill. (Aug.
30, 2015) (on file with author).
203. Id.
204. See LARGE LOTS PROGRAM, https://largelots.org/ [https://perma.cc/HJ8B-7EXX].
205. Id.
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programs have required prospective purchasers to own a property either
across the street or on the same block as the vacant lot they wish to buy.206
Applying a residency requirement for prospective urban farmers in
Englewood, however, would be more complicated. The neighborhood might
not have enough residents with the specific skill set needed to run a
successful urban farm. An African-American community organizer who had
tried to start a project with a white farmer in a nearby South-Side
neighborhood explained to me that there are only a certain number of people
in the city who have the right mix of growing and business skills.207 If
through opportunity-hoarding,208 white people have tended to monopolize
those skills, then using merit alone as a basis for deciding who should have
access to farmland held in trust could create white spaces in otherwise black
places such as Englewood.209
Yet even with these complications, it is worth noting that Growing Home
in particular, and urban farming more generally, has helped Chicagoans to
imagine and act on new ways of claiming, using, and governing urban space.
In some sense, this is as much a part of their work as growing food, or
providing job skills training. For example, during fundraisers and other
events, Growing Home’s Executive Director has taken to screening a
documentary film that features a collective farm he visited during a recent
trip to Havana.210 The film shows Chicagoans what is possible when a city
gives growers usufruct rights to vacant land.211 But to bring about such
visions in the complex legal and social landscape of the South Side of
Chicago requires figuring out who is willing to make land available for such

206. This is effectively an expansion of a city program in which homeowners could buy
city-owned vacant lots immediately adjacent to their home. FACT SHEET for: Adjacent
Neighbors
Land
Acquisition
Program,
CITY
OF
CHI.,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/banners/ANLAPfactsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94EZ-34AT].
207. Interview with Brandon Johnson, former Exec. Dir., Washington Park Consortium, in
Chi., Ill. (Jul. 13, 2015) (on file with author).
208. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 244 (2007) (defining opportunity hoarding as “the monopolization
by in-group members of access to a resource so as to keep it for themselves or charge rents to
out-group members in return for access”).
209. See Brandon Hoover, White Spaces in Black and Latino Places: Urban Agriculture
and Food Sovereignty, 3 J. AGRIC., FOOD SYS. & COMMUNITY DEV. 109, 113 (2013); see also
Minehaha Forman, Race Dynamic Seen as Obstacle in Detroit Urban Farming, MICH.
MESSENGER (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.cityfarmer.info/2009/11/02/race-dynamic-seen-asobstacle-in-detroit-urban-farming/ [https://perma.cc/4SMM-QPY7].
210. See TIERRALISMO: STORIES FROM A COOPERATIVE FARM (Americas Media Initiative,
2013).
211. Interview with Harry Rhodes, Exec. Dir., Growing Home (June 4, 2014) (on file with
author).
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uses, by whom, and on what conditions. That experimental process remains
very much a work in progress.
III. THE URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY EXPERIMENT
Mapping the socio-legal practices by which people are claiming and
governing land for urban farms and gardens can offer a new perspective on
how these might—or might not—be sites of commons governance in the
city. In reflecting on how farmers and gardeners in Chicago are
experimenting with property rules and relations, it is worth asking again: are
they in fact reclaiming a commons, as some scholars have suggested? If so,
how are they doing so? And how do their practices compare to how scholars
have thought of commons governance as a type of self-organized institution?
First, it is clear that even if most gardeners and farmers are not explicitly
reclaiming the commons, they are certainly staking claims to land, usually
vacant lots. It is possible to make the case that such pieces of land might,
collectively, be understood as a sort of common pool resource.212 It is
expensive to exclude people from a vacant lot, and particularly to do so from
all the vacant lots in a neighborhood or a city. And one person’s use of a
lot—for gardening, dealing drugs, or dumping trash—reduces the area
available to other potential users.
At the scale of a neighborhood or a city, then, we might conceive of vacant
lots as a common pool resource. When gardeners and farmers make claims
to vacant lots, then, they would be asserting that residents of a neighborhood
could manage at least some segment of this common pool resource, in order
to provide benefits to their community.
The problem with this way of thinking about the governance of urban
gardens and farms is that once benefits are established on a particular vacant
lot, they seldom remain potentially open to all users. Taken at the scale of a
particular garden or farm, land appears less like a common pool resource and
management less like commons governance. At Kumunda Garden and
Growing Home, land is fenced off and access is granted only to garden
members or to people who have enrolled in a job-training program. Only
some residents hold rights to draw upon units of the resource.
Nevertheless, the stories of Kumunda Garden and Growing Home help
illustrate how gardeners and farmers go about making claims to vacant land
as a resource that should be both used and shared. As I have described,

212. Ostrom defines common pool resources as sharing “two characteristics: (1) it is costly
to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them, and (2) the resource units
harvested by one individual are not available to others.” Elinor Ostrom, Neither Market Nor
State: Governance of Common-Pool Resources in the Twenty-First Century, 2 INT’L FOOD
RES. POL’Y INST. LECTURE SERIES 1, 2 (1994).
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people make such claims in a variety of ways.213 The assertion is not that
these are typical of all community gardeners and farmers generally, even in
Chicago. But even if they are not generalizable to all gardens everywhere,
they provide a useful way for conceptualizing how urban gardeners and
farmers make claims in a pragmatic way, experimenting with rules and
norms to see what claims succeed, and which fail.
We might think of urban growers’ property experiments as falling into
two general categories: (1) claiming access to space, and (2) figuring out
how to govern and use space once access is granted. As the stories in this
Article show, experiments with claiming space can come in many forms.
Growers experiment with ways of getting land and other resources from
private organizations that threaten to displace them. They tinker with ways
to get ownership or use of city-owned land, whether for gardens or for
commercial farms that provide community resources.
In the course of these experiments, city officials often exercise control
over where gardeners and farmers can access land. As Growing Home’s
saga illustrates, even a well-founded legal claim does not mean a gardener
can count on access to a prime parcel of downtown land. City officials have
particular neighborhoods, such as Englewood, where they understand
commercial urban agriculture to be an appropriate use of land. And in any
neighborhood, the alderman generally has veto power over whether a garden
or a farm will have access to a city-owned vacant lot.214
The city, however, is not the only player in determining access to land.
Local foundations have also gotten involved in this process.215 Their funding
supports the realization of city plans, such as the Green Healthy
Neighborhoods plan, but fills in the blank spaces in those plans by helping
to create and legitimize new models for land tenure.216 Growers who want
access to land thus are not only making claims to the city, but also pitching
their projects to foundation officials.217 Having gained the backing of
foundations, they may be better able to satisfy city officials that transferring
land into trust for for-profit urban farms will lead to use of the land and
prevent it from returning to the city’s inventory.
Once gardeners and farmers have secured access to land, they have to
figure out how to govern its use. In thinking about whether farms and
gardens constitute the “urban commons,” the question is not whether land
itself is a common pool resource, but rather whether what is happening is an
example of commons governance. Such governance is often conceived in
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See supra Parts II.A. and II.B.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra text Part II.B.3.
See id.
See id.
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terms of self-organized or self-governed resource management—in which
people develop rules for managing use (and preventing overuse) of resources
without resorting to government coercion or transfers to private
ownership.218 How well does that explain what is going on at places like the
Kumunda Garden and Growing Home?
At first glance, the concept of self-organized commons governance seems
to fit these settings quite well. Growers are indeed coming up with rules for
managing these spaces, and they often do so on their own. Community
gardens such as Kumunda have rules and usage agreements their
coordinators and their users develop, sometimes by reference to model
garden rules,219 sometimes by looking to property rules from the Old
Testament.
Nonprofit urban farms such as Growing Home, for their part, develop their
own plans for growing and allocating their yield between farm stand sales,
deliveries to restaurants, and donations to food pantries. When they are on
NeighborSpace land, like Growing Home’s Honore Street farm, they must
comply with the rules created by the land trust, such as only erecting hoop
houses or other temporary structures.220 This rule developed as the result of
NeighborSpace’s board tinkering with ways of interpreting their mission.
Both it, and the rules an urban farm creates to guide its production and sales,
might be understood as self-organization; urban farms and land trusts such
as NeighborSpace do in some sense self-govern the resources they manage.
But there are also ways in which it makes less sense to think of urban
gardens and farms as instances of self-organized commons governance.
Gardeners, farmers, and entities like NeighborSpace govern space through
rules and practices that are symbiotic with, and often constrained by,
government-mandated rules. In community gardens, for example, city
officials hold a veto over whether a garden on city or privately-owned land
may be transferred to NeighborSpace, whether water is made available via a
fire hydrant, and what materials may be used for composting. Gardener
advocacy groups can and do renegotiate and seek to expand their control
over management of these resources. And their involvement in amending
Chicago’s composting ordinance suggests that self-organization can
sometimes lead to a change to municipal rules. But ultimately the power to
make, monitor, and enforce those rules rests with government officials— and

218. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons:
Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93 (1993); see also
Sheila R. Foster, supra note 1, at 62.
219. See, e.g., Sample Garden Rules, AM. COMMUNITY GARDENING ASS’N,
https://communitygarden.org/resources/sample-garden-rules/
[https://perma.cc/9SU3MDWY].
220. See Interview with Ben Helphand, supra note 201.
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with neighbors of gardens and urban farms, who are perhaps most likely to
call in complaints to the city.
Self-organization by urban farms and by NeighborSpace is also symbiotic
with, and ultimately subordinate to, rules enforced by municipal officials.
Transferring city land to farms and to NeighborSpace creates secure,
affordable land for nonprofit growers, while also helping city officials move
vacant lots in their inventory into productive use. This may not directly
expand the tax base,221 but it can help remove liabilities from the city’s
balance sheet.222 Moreover, local government officials retain a great deal of
control over how NeighborSpace governs the allocation and use of its land.
Much of the land trust’s board is composed of government employees, and
the organization relies on allocations from the city, the Chicago Park District,
and the Cook County Forest Preserve District for much of its revenue.223
Thus even as people in Englewood work to imagine a land tenure model that
could hold land for for-profit farms, they are doing so in the context of a land
trust created by, and responsive to, local governments. This complicates the
conception of urban farms and gardens as pure spaces of self-organization or
even spaces in which government merely plays a facilitative role.
It is equally difficult to see apparent self-organization in urban gardens
and farms as entirely distinct from the rules and norms central to private
property. We might better conceive of self-organization in gardens and
farms as a process of tinkering with the central features of private property,
rather than inventing new rules of community management out of whole
cloth. In gardens like Kumunda, for example, garden plots are leased for a
season to individual gardeners, giving them the right to exclude others and
benefit from the production on what is effectively their property for the
season. Garden coordinators experiment with the conditions that apply to
such leases. If you do not use your plot by a certain date, you may lose the
right to use it and exclude others. Or if you do not opt out of the gleaning
program, you may have others enter your land and seize some portion of your
produce. If you do not chip in to plant a common garden outside the fence,
then people may end up jumping the fence and picking from your garden.
Rights often understood as part of the basic structure of private property—

221. One study suggests that community gardens raise surrounding property values, but it
is unclear whether urban farms have the same effect. See Ioan Voicu & Vicki Been, The Effect
of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 36 REAL ESTATE ECON. 241, 243,
268 (2008).
222. The city is no longer liable for the potential environmental contamination of the vacant
land and may face less costs in policing unused spaces.
223. See
Board,
NEIGHBORSPACE,
http://neighbor-space.org/about/board/
[https://perma.cc/S9QL-HG2G]; Interview with Ben Helphand, supra note 201; Interview
with Mary Jo Schnell, Former Exec. Dir., NeighborSpace, in Chi., Ill. (Aug. 10, 2012) (on
file with author).

290

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

the right to exclude others, and to benefit from use224—remain the default
expectations. Garden coordinators and gleaning program leaders continue
to tinker with ways of shifting those defaults in a direction that creates social
obligations to the community on the part of individual gardeners.
A similar tinkering with the bundle of rights that constitute private
property characterizes property experimentation in the context of urban
farms. Vacant parcels acquired from the city come with redevelopment
agreements that require they be used for particular purposes. For example,
the redevelopment agreement for Growing Home’s Wood Street farm
required that the land be put into agricultural use by a nonprofit that provides
job skills training.225 This suited Growing Home’s needs, of course, but at
least in theory it also meant that if these conditions were not met, the city
could take back ownership of the land.226 Social obligations effectively run
with the land; to get out of them requires negotiating with the city, as when
Growing Home found that the first piece of land it had received from the city
was contaminated, and wanted to resell the parcel and take the proceeds.
Farmland leased from NeighborSpace is similarly restricted. Farmers
must use the land for growing food, only build temporary structures, and, at
least for the moment, be a nonprofit organization that serves some
community purpose.227 It seems possible that a future model that holds
farmland in trust for for-profit farmers could include some sort of residency
requirement. Again, although such farmland is private property, these
experiments with how it may be governed are effectively ways of tinkering
with the bundle of rights so as to promote the use of land as both a resource
for commercial farmers and for their surrounding community.
Even though urban farms and community gardens have come to be
thought of as prototypical examples of the urban commons,228 a closer sociolegal mapping of how people have experimented with property relations
suggests something different than a “pure” form of commons governance.
These are not sites where self-organization of resource management takes
place apart from the coercive influence of government and the forms and
norms of private property. If we are to think of urban gardens and farms as
“the urban commons,” it might be better to see them as an experimental form
of governance that encourages the treatment and use of land as a shared,

224. Henry Smith, in arguing against the bundle-of-sticks conception of property, states
the conception that the right to exclude and the right to the residual claim are “basic features”
of property. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1709–
10 (2012).
225. See Redevelopment Agreement, supra note 153.
226. See Interview with Harry Rhodes, supra note 212.
227. See Interviews with Ben Helphand, supra notes 190, 201.
228. See supra Part I.A.
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community resource. This involves both experimenting with rules by which
to govern particular shared pieces of land, and tinkering with the possibilities
made available by existing laws and features of private property. A sociolegal mapping of how people actually allocate and govern land for urban
gardens and farms helps identify the wide range of rules and norms in play.
People who seek to access and collectively govern urban land can pull upon
everything from the rules that regulate nonprofits to zoning codes, land trusts
to transfers of city and federal land, weed ordinances to norms of sharing.
This web of rules both creates and limits possibilities for people in places
like Woodlawn or Englewood hoping to rework who can use the vacant land
in their neighborhoods. But it also creates opportunities that people or
organizations from the other side of the city may seek to exploit, whether as
a place to garden, or to set up an urban farm. This complicates the idea that
a particular urban garden or farm is a “commons” governed and used by
neighborhood residents. The property experiments that take place on such a
site may in fact make it a resource for the entire city, and contribute to the
experience of the city itself as a commons.229 But as with other resources in
the city, it may become a site of contention over who can access, use, and
benefit from the resource, and whether the rules that regulate access and use
reproduce the forms of social exclusion common to other areas of urban
governance.
***
If we understand the emergence of new forms of sharing and governing
resources in urban farms and gardens not as the “urban commons” but rather
as the varied products of property experimentalism, how might that affect
visions for urban policy? First, it would emphasize that there is not one
single policy intervention to support peoples’ efforts to bring about commons
governance of urban land. People both inside and outside local government
pursue multiple and quite diverse points of influence as they seek to bring
about sites and systems of collective resource management. Innovation takes
many forms, from adapting land trust models to new contexts to imagining
how the Old Testament could support claims to other peoples’ tomatoes.
Socio-legal mapping, which already helps guide urban growers and their
allies as they develop property experiments, could also be a tool for people
who understand themselves as policymakers. It could help identify ways in
which a wide range of government agencies and actors—from aldermen to
city planners to park district officials—could help foster experiments that
promote community control and management of resources. Following the
path suggested by scholars of democratic experimentalism, a continual

229. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 20, at 50.
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process of mapping could monitor the progress of these experiments, and
draw lessons to be applied in subsequent innovations.
NeighborSpace offers a promising example of such an experimentalist
process. Having identified a problem of community-managed open space,
local governments came together to create an entity that would provide
people with support and space to figure out how to manage community
gardens.230 The lessons from this work helped inspire an expansion of the
land trust’s work into holding land for nonprofit farms, which may soon
morph again into holding land for for-profit farms.231
For policymakers, the question would be: “What rule best promotes
experimentation by people who want to promote community management
and sharing of resources?” This could offer a new criterion for decisionmaking, alongside existing criteria such as what will promote growth, quality
of life, or an expanding tax base. Just as those existing criteria are at times
in alignment and other times in tension, a prioritization of property
experimentation may sometimes align with growth or growing the tax base,
and sometimes not.
This perspective turns a common way of thinking about “the urban
commons” on its head. Often, policies promoting urban farms and gardens
focus on protecting these sites of community resource management from
development, a defensive struggle that pits sites understood as instances of
the urban commons against urban growth. An experimentalist approach
might focus instead on identifying and creating new spaces for shared
community governance—a proactive struggle which imagines ways in
which sites of community resource management might encourage economic
development, or in which forms of democratic planning help increase the
productive and efficient use of urban land.232
An experimentalist policy for promoting the “urban commons,” however,
has a built-in contradiction. As the Kumunda and Growing Home stories
illustrate, property experiments often push the bounds of what government
or nonprofit actors consider imaginable. This is what the founders of
Growing Home did when they staked a claim to land on the downtown
lakefront and planned to build a farm for Chicago’s homeless residents.
Federal officials were willing to entertain the experiment—the homeless
advocates did, after all, state a plausible claim. But city officials did not take
a stance that promoted experimentation—at least, not when such an
experiment was imagined as the front door of a major tourist attraction.

230. See supra Part I.C.
231. See supra Part III.A.
232. See Joel Rogers, Productive Democracy, THE NATION (Mar. 23, 2015)
https://www.thenation.com/article/productive-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/VH7B-7Z5P].
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If property experiments sometimes conflict with the interests and plans of
city officials, then a policy framework that fosters shared community use of
resources through property experimentation might itself become the object
of experiments. People often conceive of the urban commons as sites that
are community-owned and managed, but people who want to preserve such
sites might try to secure public ownership and management. This happened
in Chicago in the past, when garden advocates, after the First World War,
sought to use eminent domain to take public ownership of land on which
people had built vacant lot gardens and war gardens.233 And it is a strategy
that some garden advocates have lately pursued in New York City. A policy
that promotes experiments by residents and non-profits to bring about forms
of shared governance that provide public goods not provided by the state
could evolve into claims that the state itself should directly support the
provision of those public goods.234
CONCLUSION
In their recent excitement to find the commons in the garden, social
scientists and legal scholars have strived see the forest, but have at times
missed the trees. A desire to identify urban farms and community gardens
as examples of the urban commons has fostered a habit of working
downward from the master concept, rather than building up from the
practices actually emerging on the ground. This risks missing ways in which
what urban farmers and gardeners are doing might actually be in tension with
conceptions of what the commons is, and how it comes about.
This Article has offered a glimpse of what we might see if we paid
attention to the property practices—and the property experiments—of urban
farmers and gardeners. Mapping these practices suggests that at times these
experiments may indeed produce forms of shared resource management
similar to the types of self-organization that scholars and advocates of the
commons would expect (and hope) to see. At other times, urban gardens and
farms may be governed by a mix of rules developed by growers and
ordinances and regulations created and enforced by government officials.
Growers’ tinkering with ways to promote use and sharing may involve
adapting, rather than rejecting or transcending, certain basic features of
private property—such as the right to exclusive use and enjoyment of the
benefits of a resource. A socio-legal mapping of these property experiments,

233. See BOARD OF WEST CHI. PARK COMMISSIONERS, A GREATER WEST PARK SYSTEM:
AFTER THE PLANS OF JENS JENSEN 15 (1920).
234. In discussing the urban commons, Sheila Foster adopts this view of the role of
nonprofits in providing public goods that go beyond those provided by government. See
Foster, supra note 1, at 113–114.
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then, reveals hybridized varieties of shared property governance, rather than
pure, unadulterated examples of the urban commons.
Urban policymakers could benefit from a more realistic understanding of
how urban growers use gardens and farms as sites of experimentation, not
only with growing practices, but also with the rules, norms, and practices of
property. Rather than viewing the role of local government as simply
defending space for people to grow food—or as facilitating an idealized
notion of the urban commons—progressive urban planners and city officials
would do well to see such gardens as sites where citizens can experiment
with how urban resources can and should be owned and governed. Such an
experimentalist framework would require more patience from policymakers
and local officials than a framework that simply defends or promotes the
urban commons. It might encourage claims both against the state, and to
private property, which could seem in tension with the commons itself.
Compared with a policy that simply encourages self-organization, or sees
local government as a booster or protector of the urban commons, a policy
that promotes property experimentation might bear more satisfying fruit.

